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THE 

INTERNATIONAL  POLITY 

BULLETIN 

No.  lo 

THE  WAR  AIMS  OF  THE 
UNITED  STATES 

A  STUDY  OUTLINE 


BY 


Lindsay 


R^OCERS 


April,  191  8 


THE  FEDERATION  OF  INTERNATIONAL  POLITY  CLUBS 
EDITORIAL  offices:     4O7   WEST    I  I  7TH  STREET 
NEW  YORK  CITY 


Copyright,  191 8 
By  Lindsay  Rogers 


CONTENTS 

Introduction 3 

A.  War  Aims '  . 5 

B.  Why  Discuss  War  Aims? 8 

C.  The  United  States  and  the  Settlement 11 

D.  President  Wilson's  Diplomacy 13 

E.  President  Wilson's  War  Aims 16 

1.  Open  diplomacy 16 

2.  Freedom  of  the  seas 21 

3.  Equality  of  trade  conditions 26 

4.  Reduction  of  armaments 30 

5.  Adjustment  of  colonial  claims 32 

6.  Russia 35 

7.  Belgium 36 

8.  Alsace-Lorraine 40 

9-    Italy 43 

10.  Austria-Hungary 46 

11.  The  Balkans 48 

12.  Turkey 50 

13.  Poland 51 

14.  A  League  of  Nations 52 


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THE  WAR  AIMS  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES 

A  STUDY  OUTLINE 

The  settlement  after  the  war,  whenever  and  however  it  may 
come  is  bound  to  be  concerned  with  problems  of  fundamental 
importance  that  will,  as  Mr.  Lloyd  George  has  said,  "settle 
the  destiny  of  nations,  the  course  of  human  life  for  God  knows 
how  many  ages."  Among  these  abstract  problems  will  be  the 
/nature  and  functions  of  the  state;  the  use  of  arbitration;  the 
j system  of  alliances  and  the  groupings  of  the  powers;  the 
!  alleged  rivalry  of  nations  and  the  chances  for  a  League  of 
(States;  the  competition  of  armaments  and  their  limitation; 
diplomacy  and  its  defects;  the  effects  of  absolutism  and 
democracy  upon  national  policies;  the  principle  of  nationality; 
the  use  of  plebiscites;  the  value  of  international  guarantees; 
the  validity  of  treaties ;  possible  changes  in  and  a  sanction  for 
international  law;  the  advisability  of  increasing  the  number 
of  permanently  neutralized  states;  the  value  of  indemnities; 
the  government  of  subject  races  by  international  commissions, 
and  the  relation  of  politics  to  economics  and  both  to  strategy. 
The  application  of  these  general  principles  to  concrete  situa- 
tions will  raise  many  questions  of  stupendous  importance. 

Already  the  books  published  on  the  war  and  its  issues  num- 
ber thousands;  only  the  specialist  can  be  even  partially  famil- 
iar with  the  vast  amount  of  material  on  war  aims  and  peace 
terms,  and  for  the  student  who  desires  to  be  informed  upon  the 
problems  that  will  have  to  be  solved  at  the  settlement,  some 
apparatus  is  desirable,  if  not  necessary,  to  enable  him  to  use  the 
existing  material.  Magazine  articles  and  pamphlets  can  deal 
with  but  single  points;  a  few  comprehensive  books  of  great 
value  have  been  published,  but  for  a  more  than  cursory  read- 
ing, the  hotly  debated  questions  must  be  oriented  and  different 
views  indicated. 

This  study  outline  has  been  prepared  to  meet  this  need.  In 
its  general  plan  it  follows  and  in  some  cases  quotes  from,  al- 


though  it  is  more  elaborate  than,  those  issued  by  the  EngHsh 
Council  for  the  Study  of  International  Relations  and  the 
League  of  Nations  Society.  As  would  seem  natural  it  is  based 
upon  President  Wilson's  programme  (January  8,  191 8)  of  the 
fourteen  international  adjustments  which,  in  his  opinion,  must 
be  considered  when  the  settlement  is  arranged.  After  some 
general  suggestions  concerning  the  discussion  of  war  aims  and 
peace  terms  before  victory  is  secured,  these  fourteen  points  are 
annotated. 

A  few  books  will  be  found  of  chief  interest.  The  War  and 
Democracy  (Macmillan)  and  International  Relations  (Mac- 
millan),  by  various  English  writers,  give  an  admirable  survey 
of  the  issues  of  the  war.  C.  Ernest  Fayle,  The  Great  Settlement 
(Dufilield),  H.  N.  Brailsford,  A  League  of  Nations  (Macmillan), 
A.  J.  Toynbee,  Nationality  and  the  War  (Dutton)  have  con- 
sidered most  of  the  problems  of  the  settlement  and  have 
written  with  great  interest  and  effect.  Mr.  Brailsford's  book 
is  especially  good  and  although  arguing  strongly  for  a  League 
of  Nations,  does  not  make  the  blunder  of  American  authors 
— for  example.  Goldsmith,  A  League  to  Enforce  Peace  (Mac- 
millan)— in  minimizing  the  severe  tests  to  which  a  League  will 
be  put  if  it  is  called  upon  to  settle  existing  or  possible  concrete 
questions  of  European  politics.  A  great  deal  of  valuable 
material  is  also  to  be  found  in  The  New  Europe  (Constable),  a 
young  English  weekly  review  that  is  now  being  widely  read. 
The  other  books  and  articles  referred  to  are  for  the  most  part 
easily  accessible.  It  was  not  Intended  that  the  opinions  of 
the  writer  should  appear  in  this  study  outline.  If  they  do  he 
alone  is  responsible. 

University  of  Virginia.  L.  R. 


A.  WAR  AIMS 

Before  December,  1916,  there  was  not  much  discussion  of 
peace.  War  aims  had  been  fully  presented  in  the  diplomatic 
correspondence  published  by  the  belligerents  and  in  the 
speeches  of  statesmen  who  frequently  took  notice  of  what  had 
been  said  by  the  enemy  (e.g.,  von  Bethmann-HoUweg,  April  5, 
1916,  Mr.  Asquith,  April  10,  1916,  Current  History,  May, 
1916,  pp.  228,  231,  and  von  Bethmann-Hollweg,  November  9, 
1916,  Current  History,  February,  191 7,  p.  867).  These  docu- 
ments and  speeches  are  readily  accessible  in  a  variety  of  forms. 

There  were,  of  course,  many  rumors,  semi-official  "feelers," 
and  individual  discussions  of  peace.  On  the  first  anniversary 
of  the  war  the  Pope  issued  an  appeal  to  the  belligerents,  but 
it  was  little  more  than  an  eulogy  of  peace  in  the  abstract  {Cur- 
rent History,  September,  1915,  p.  1022) ;  in  his  submarine  note 
of  May  4,  1916,  von  Jagow,  German  Secretary  of  State  for 
Foreign  Affairs,  said : 

The  German  Government,  conscious  of  Germany's  strength,  twice 
[December  9,  1915,  April  5,  1916  ?]  within  the  last  few  months  an- 
nounced before  the  world  its  readiness  to  make  peace  on  terms  safe- 
guarding Germany's  vital  interests,  thus  indicating  that  it  is  not 
Germany's  fault  if  peace  is  still  withheld  from  the  nations  of  Europe. 
(Note  of  May  4,  1916,  Current  History,  June  1916,  p.  455.) 

and  on  May  27th,  speaking  to  the  League  to  Enforce  Peace 
President  Wilson  made  a  formal  statement  of  his  willingness  to 
mediate : 

If  it  should  ever  be  our  privilege  to  suggest  or  initiate  a  movement 
for  peace  among  the  nations  now  at  war,  I  am  sure  that  the  people 
of  the  United  States  would  wish  their  Government  to  move  along 
these  lines: 

First.  Such  a  settlement  with  regard  to  their  immediate  interests 
as  the  belligerents  may  agree  upon.  We  have  nothing  material  of  any 
kind  to  ask  for  ourselves,  and  are  quite  aware  that  we  are  in  no  sense 
or  degree  parties  to  the  present  quarrel.  Our  interest  is  only  in  peace 
and  its  future  guarantees. 

5 


Second.  A  universal  association  of  the  nations  to  maintain  the 
inviolate  security  of  the  highway  of  the  seas  for  the  common  and 
unhindered  use  of  all  the  nations  of  the  world,  and  to  prevent  any  war, 
begun  either  contrary  to  treaty  covenants  or  without  warning  and  full 
submission  of  the  causes  to  the  opinion  of  the  world — a  virtual  guar- 
antee of  territorial  integrity  and  political  independence.  {Current 
History,  July,  1916,  p.  736). 

Mr.  Wilson  had  previously  made  a  formal  offer  of  mediation 
(August  5,  1914)  that  was  courteously  declined.  In  September, 
1914,  Ambassador  Gerard  reported  to  President  Wilson  the 
views  of  the  Imperial  Chancellor,  von  Bethmann-Hollweg,  that 

Germany  was  appreciative  of  the  American  Government's  interest 
and  offer  of  services  in  trying  to  make  peace 

but  that  in  view  of  the  treaty  pledging  the  Allies  against  any 
separate  cessation  of  hostilities, 

The  United  States  ought  to  get  proposals  of  peace  from  the  Allies. 
Germany  could  accept  only  a  lasting  peace,  one  that  would  make  her 
people  secure  against  future  attacks.  To  accept  mediation  now  would 
be  interpreted  by  the  Allies  as  a  sign  of  weakness  on  the  part  of  Ger- 
many and  would  be  misunderstood  by  the  German  people,  who,  having 
made  great  sacrifices,  had  the  right  to  demand  guarantees  of  security. 
{Current  History,  December,  1914,  p.  273). 

But  so  far  as  ever  disclosed  the  overtures  had  no  more  definite 
result. 

The  real  discussion  of  peace  terms  began  with  Germany's 
offer  of  December  12,  191 6,  the  Allied  reply  to  it,  and  the 
interchanges  over  President  Wilson's  note  of  December  18, 
1916,  calling  for  a  statement  of  war  aims.  These  communica- 
tions are  published  in  Current  History,  in  International  Concili- 
ation, Nos.  1 10  and  1 1 1,  and  with  supplementary  documents  by 
the  Division  of  International  Law  of  the  Carnegie  Endowment 
for  International  Peace  {Official  Communications  and  Speeches 
Relating  to  Peace  Proposals,  igi6-igi'j.  Pamphlet  No.  23). 
President  Wilson's  address  to  the  Senate  on  January  22,  191 7 
and  his  address  to  Congress  (February  3)  on  the  breaking  of 
diplomatic  relations  will  be  found  in  this  last  named  collection, 
while  the  armed  neutrality  address  (February  26),  that  of 
April  2  asking  for  a  declaration  of  war,  the  Flag  Day  Address 

6 


(June  14),  and  the  communications  to  Russia  in  May  and 
June  have  either  been  issued  by  the  Committee  on  Public  In- 
formation, or  are  in  Current  History.  (See  also,  'The  Entry  of 
the  United  States',  International  Conciliation^  No.  114).  The 
Pope's  peace  proposal  and  the  replies  are  printed  in  Interna- 
tional Conciliation  No.  119.  During  the  year,  of  course,  there 
were  a  number  of  important  speeches  by  British  and  French 
statesmen. 

In  December,  191 7,  there  began  another  important  "peace 
offensive"  brought  about  by  the  negotiations  with  Russia;  the 
declaration  of  British  Labor's  War  Aims  (December  28); 
Mr.  Lloyd  George's  speech  (January  5);  President  Wilson's 
message  to  Congress  (January  8) ;  the  replies  of  Count  Hertling 
and  Count  Czernin  (January  24);  the  President's  rejoinder 
addressed  principally  to  Austria  (February  11),  and  Mr.  Lloyd 
George's  and  Mr.  Asquith's  speeches  the  next  day.  This 
enumeration  does  not  include  such  important  communications 
as  those  of  President  Eliot  or  Lord  Lansdowne's  letters  to  the 
Daily  Telegraph.  All  of  these  can  be  found  in  Current  History. 
See  also,  International  Conciliation,  Nos.  122  and  123. 


B.  WHY  DISCUSS  WAR  AIMS  ? 

An  argument  for  a  full  disclosure  of  the  purposes  for  which 
armaments  will  be  used  is  to  be  found  in  Norman  Angell's  The 
Dangers  of  Half-Preparedness  (Putnam,  19 16);   and  the  best 
case  for  a  diplomatic  as  well  as  a  military  offensive  is  made  out 
<   in  Mr.  Angell's  last  book,  War  Aims:   The  Need  for  a  Parlia- 
^   ment  of  the  Allies  (Headley  Bros.,  191 7)  some  of  which  appeared 
<(  in  The  New  Republic  and  the  argument  of  which  is  substan- 
tially similar  to  the  position  taken  editorially  by  The  New 
Republic  and  The  Nation  (London). 
Mr.  Angell  says: 

The  recommendations  of  the  Paris  Conference  constitute  an  ad- 
>  mission  that,  however  complete  our  military  victory,  Germany  will 
/  remain  a  great  potential  military,  political,  and  economic  factor  in 
/    international  relations. 

/  Have  we,  then,  any  clear  picture  of  the  conditions  which  we  are 
)  trying  to  establish?  Does  the  "destruction  of  Prussian  Militarism" 
mean  that  Germany  is  to  have  no  army  as  well  as  no  navy?  If  she  is 
to  have  an  army,  is  its  size  to  bear  some  relation  to  the  size  of  other 
armies?  If  so,  what  is  to  be  the  ratio?  And,  when  we  demand  the 
destruction  of  her  military  forces,  are  we  to  offer  Germany  no  guar- 
antee against  outrageous  demand,  or  attacks  upon  her  by  other 
Powers? 

Until  we  have  some  notion,  at  least,  of  these  things,  we  can- 
not pretend  to  know  what  the  destruction  of  German  Militarism 
means  .... 
/  The  announcement  of  a  plan  of  guarantees  by  a  new  Paris  Confer- 
/  ence,  which  would  truly  represent  all  the  great  nations  of  the  world, 
outside  of  Germany  and  Austria,  if  made  during  the  war,  would  be  a 
powerful,  perhaps  determining,  factor  in  undermining  the  military 
resistance  of  the  German  people  to  the  aims  of  the  Allies,  since  it  would 
make  it  apparent  that  those  aims  offer  the  best  security  for  the  rights 
and  existence  of  the  Germans  themselves;  and  such  an  announcement 
would  constitute  the  best  means  of  aiding  a  revolt  of  German  sentiment 
against  militarist  philosophy  and  German  Militarism.  (Angell,  War 
Aims,  pp.  55,  118-119.) 

8 


As  illustrating  Mr.  Angell's  contentions,  the  following  inci- 
dent may  be  cited : 

On  December  14,  Mr.  Lloyd  George  in  an  address  at  Gray's 
Inn,  made  a  strong  speech  in  which  little  was  said  about  any 
war  aims  except  victory.  Count  Hertling,  the  Imperial  Chan- 
cellor, immediately  granted  an  interview  to  the  Wolff  Bureau, 
the  German  semi-official  news  agency,  in  which  he  declared: 

In  his  last  speech  Mr.  Lloyd  George  calls  us  criminals  and  bandits. 
As  it  has  already  once  been  declared  in  the  Reichstag,  we  do  not  intend 
to  join  in  this  renewal  of  the  customs  of  the  Homeric  heroes.  Modern 
wars  are  not  won  by  invective,  but  are  rather,  perhaps,  prolonged, 
because  after  this  abuse  by  the  English  Prime  Minister  it  is  out  of  the 
question  for  us  to  negotiate  with  men  of  such  temper  . 

Just  over  a  year  has  passed  since  we  and  our  Allies  offered  the  enemy 
the  hand  of  peace.  It  was  rejected.  Meanwhile  our  reply  to  the  Papal 
Note  has  again  set  forth  our  standpoint.  At  this  moment  when  I  have 
just  received  news  that  the  truce  which  already  existed  between  us 
and  our  Eastern  neighbors  has  passed  into  a  formal  armistice,  the 
speech  of  the  British  Prime  Minister  is  before  me.  It  is  the  answer  of 
the  present  British  Cabinet  to  the  Papal  Note.  Our  way  in  the  West 
is  accordingly  clear.  {London  Times  [weekly  edition],  December 
21,  1917.) 

A  view  contrary  to  that  of  Mr.  Angell : 

The  truth  is  that  all  discussion  of  war  aims,  in  advance  of  the  sal- 
vation of  the  world  from  the  German  menace,  amounts  merely  to 
words.  If  Germany  wins  the  war,  her  aims  will  prevail  and  we  know 
what  they  are.  The  Bolsheviki,  who  have  long  thundered  against 
Allied  war  aims,  have  reduced  Russia  to  impotence  only  to  discover 
that  Germany  demands  of  them  all  the  Russian  territory  she  has  con- 
quered by  force  of  arms  during  the  war,  and  a  mortgage  on  the  economic 
future  of  Russia  in  addition.  Those  who  are  seeking  to  promote  the 
same  disorder  in  Allied  nations  would  find  Germany  demanding 
Belgium  and  the  North  of  France,  once  France  and  Britain  were 
weakened  by  internal  dissensions. 

When  real  peace  terms  are  to  be  made,  we  in  the  United  States  will  be 
able  to  speak  a  powerful  word  for  justice  and  against  aggrandizements 
which  promise  not  real  peace  but  new  wars.  But  until  there  is  prospect 
of  any  but  German  terms,  which  we  must  all  fight,  there  is  no  object 
and  there  is  real  danger  in  the  discussion,  which  is  encouraged  and  in- 
duced in  no  small  measure  by  German  agents  all  over  the  world.  (Frank 
H.  Simonds,  The  Fifth  Campaign'.     Review  of  Reviews,  January,  191 8.) 

9 


Is  the  interchange  of  views  of  statesmen  in  the  war  (very 
free  in  comparison  with  previous  discussions)  to  be  attributed 
to  an  acceptance  of  Mr.  Angell's  position  or  to  a  desire  to 
secure  the  support  of  public  opinion? 

How  far  should  the  Allies  go  in  stating  publicly  the  terms 
that  they  will  insist  upon  at  the  settlement? 

Is  there  danger  in  inconsistency  between  peace  terms  as 
expressed  by  the  Allied  statesmen?  {e.g.,  President  Wilson's 
address  to  Congress,  February  ii,  191 8,  on  Austria  and  the 
position  taken  by  Mr.  Lloyd  George?) 

How  far  should  the  disclosure  and  discussion  of  peace  terms 
be  checked  because  it  serves  to  divide  the  Allies  and  hearten 
pacifists? 

Can  Prussian  militarism  ever  be  finally  destroyed  until  the 
German  people  have  experienced  a  change  of  heart  and  have 
rebelled  against  its  philosophy? 

Can  this  change  of  heart  come  so  long  as  the  German  people 
believe  that  they  must  fight  for  this  philosophy  in  order  to 
protect  themselves,  or  be  ready  to  fight  in  order  to  protect 
themselves  after  the  settlement? 

How  far  should  the  people  through  Parliamentary  repre- 
sentatives. Socialist  and  Labor  organizations,  participate  in  a 
discussion  of  the  settlement? 


10 


C.   THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  THE  SETTLEMENT 

The  United  States  is  not  a  party  to  the  treaty,  signed  at 
London,  September  5,  1914,  pledging  Great  Britain,  France 
and  Russia  not  to  conclude  peace  separately  and  promising 
"that  when  terms  of  peace  come  to  be  discussed  no  one  of  the 
Allies  will  demand  terms  of  peace  without  the  previous  agree- 
ment of  each  of  the  other  Allies."  (See  Current  History, 
December  8,  1914,  p.  297.)  Japan  later  acceded  to  the  treaty. 
Semi-officially  it  is  stated  that  the  United  States  looks  on  the 
Entente  Powers  as  "co-belligerents"  rather  than  "allies";  that 
there  is  a  "gentleman's  agreement"  rather  than  a  formal 
document. 

Every  one  of  the  nations  at  war  with  Germany  took  up 
arms  for  some  specific  reason  that  can  be  briefly,  if  incom- 
pletely, stated:  Russia  to  save  Serbia;  Italy  to  secure  terri- 
tory from  Austria,  partly  for  the  latter  country's  breach  of 
the  terms  of  the  Triple  Alliance;  Great  Britain  to  defend 
Belgium  and  protect  France;  Belgium,  France,  and  Serbia 
to  protect  themselves.  The  use  of  the  submarine  against 
merchant  vessels  was  the  one  offense  that  served  to  associate 
the  United  States  with  the  Entente  nations.  But  as  Viscount 
Grey  has  said : 

Militarism  stands  for  things  that  all  democracies,  if  they  wish  to 
remain  free  and  to  be  part  of  a  world  that  is  free,  must  hate.  This 
conviction  and  a  sense  that  the  old  barriers  of  the  world  are  broken 
down  by  modern  conditions,  that  the  cause  of  humanity  is  one,  and 
that  no  nation  so  great  and  free  as  the  United  States  could  stand  aside 
in  this  crisis  without  sacrificing  its  honor  and  losing  its  soul,  are — so  we 
believe — the  real  motive  and  cause  of  the  decision  of  the  United  States. 
Democracies  are  reluctant  to  take  such  decisions  until  they  are  attacked 
or  until  their  own  material  interests  are  directly  and  deeply  involved, 
and  the  United  States  did  not  take  the  decision  till  German  action  in 
the  War  made  it  imperative;  but  then  they  took  it  with  a  clearness, 
and  emphasis,  and  a  declaration  of  principle  that  will  be  one  of  the 
landmarks  and  shining  examples  of  all  human  history-.    (The  Rt.  Hon. 

II 


Viscount  Grey,  America  and  Freedom  [Preface],  p.  iv.  [Allen  &  Unwin]; 
reprinted,  International  Conciliation,  No.  120,  November,  19 17,  p.  24.) 
(President  Wilson's  series  of  addresses  to  Congress,  February  3  and  26 
and  April  2,  1917,  should  be  read  in  this  connection.) 

How  far  did  the  United  States,  by  entering  the  war,  approve 

the  war  aims  of  the  Allies  as  expressed  in  the  replies  to  the 

German  note  (December,  1916)  and  President  Wilson's  note? 

Compare  the  views  expressed  by  the  Allies  and  Mr.  Wilson. 

Would  the  United  States  be  justified,  as  a  late  comer  into 

:  the  war,  owing  much  to  England  and  France  for  keeping 

;  Germany  at  bay  for  more  than  two  years,  in  using  her  influ- 

;  ence  against  the  realization  of  certain  war  aims  generally  said  to 

be  fundamental,  e.  ^.,  the  return  of  Alsace-Lorraine  to  France? 

I      How  far  can  the  United  States  claim  the  right  to  be  con- 

\  suited  on  war  aims  covered  by  the  formula  "restitution  and 

?  reparation?" 

How  far  are  the  war  aims  of  the  Allies  inconsistent  with 
)  Mr.  Wilson's  more  recent  formula  (February  11,  1918)?  How 
)  far  is  the  United  States  bound  to  support  readjustments  which 
(  go  farther  than  merely  inaugurating  a  League  of  Nations  as 
;  one  form  of  international  insurance? 

Should  the  United  States  be  a  party  to  all  phases  of  the 
settlement,  even  those  that  do  not  remotely  concern  her  by 
menacing  her  security  in  the  future? 


D.   PRESIDENT  WILSON'S  DIPLOMACY 

I.  President  Wilson's  attempt  to  create  a  rift  between  the 
German  military  party  on  the  one  hand  and  the  German  ( 
people  and  Austria-Hungary  on  the  other  is  his  distinctive 
contribution  to  the  diplomacy  of  the  Allies.     An  appeal  to 
democratic  elements  in  Germany  is  particularly  made  in  the 
reply  to  the  Pope  but  appears  in  all  of  Mr.  Wilson's  utterances   > 
on  the  war;    the  same  appeal  to  Austria-Hungary  to  free  ) 
herself  from  Prussian  domination  is  the  basis  of  the  address  to   ( 
Congress  asking  for  a  declaration   of  war  against  Austria   \ 
{Current  History^  January,  1918,  p.  63)  and  the  address  on 
Count  Czernin's  speech  (February  11,  1918;    see  below,  E.) 
The  distinction  between  the  Germans  and  their  government  is   i 
officially  echoed  to  some  small  extent  in  England  by  Mr.   \ 
Balfour's  phrase  that  Germany  must  either  become  powerless   ) 
or  free  and  by  Mr.  Lloyd  George's  recent  speeches  which   > 
imply  that  more  moderate  terms  could  be  made  with  a  democ- 
ratized Germany.     The  various  declarations  of  the  British  \ 
Labor  Party  are  more  explicit.     (See  President  Wilson's  Flag  ? 
Day  speech,  June  14,  1917,  Current  History,  July,  1917,  p.  i, 
and  the  British  Labor  Platform,  Current  History,  February, 
1918,  p.  200;  also  International  Conciliation  No.  123.) 

At  Buffalo  (November  13,  191 7),  addressing  the  American 
Federation  of  Labor,  Mr.  Wilson  went  out  of  his  way  to  pay 
a  tribute  to  the  German  people : 

I  believe  that  the  spirit  of  freedom  can  get  into  the  hearts  of  Germans  / 
and  find  as  fine  a  welcome  there  as  it  can  find  in  any  other  hearts,  but  / 
the  spirit  of  freedom  does  not  suit  the  plans  of  the  Pan-Germans.  \ 
{Current  History,  December,  1917,  p.  441.) 

The  theoretical  distinction  between  the  German  Government  and 
the  German  People  is  sound  enough,  but  we  cannot  help  thinking  that 
up  to  the  present  it  has  proved  quite  negligible  in  practice.  Wilson  is 
right  in  a  sense  when  he  says  that  the  German  people  "did  not  choose 
the  War."  They  did  not  choose  it  because,  under  the  Bismarckian 
Constitution,  they  have  no  choice  at  all  in  such  high  matters,  but  they 

13 


accepted  it  with  enthusiasm.  They  have  given  it  throughout  their 
active  support.  Their  representatives  have  voted  with  unanimity 
supplies  for  its  continuance.  {The  London  Times,  commenting  on 
President  Wilson's  reply  to  the  Pope;  see  also,  Brig.  Gen.  F.  G.  Stone, 
'At  War  with  the  German  People',  Nineteenth  Century,  August, 
1917-) 

Admitting  the  correctness  of  the  position  here  taken,  does 
it  lessen  the  chances  for  success  of  Mr.  Wilson's  policy?  What 
are  the  chances  for  the  success  of  such  a  policy? 

When  Mr.  Wilson  distinguishes  between  the  German 
Government  and  the  German  people  is  he  calling  attention 
to  an  actual  fact  or  is  he  simply  looking  toward  the  future? 

Would  a  Germany  "free"  be  a  lesser  menace  to  the  future 
peace  of  the  world  than  a  Germany  "powerless?" 

Would  a  Germany  in  which  the  people  had  an  effective  con- 
trol over  foreign  policy,  the  army,  and  the  navy  likely  be  "im- 
perialistic" or  "militaristic?" 

Can  the  Prussian  military  domination  be  utterly  and  finally 
destroyed — a  frequently  reiterated  Entente  war  aim — until  the 
German  people  insist  upon  its  being  destroyed? 

The  following  books  may  be  found  of  some  help:  Ackerman, 
Germany,  the  Next  Republic  (Doran);  Fernau,  The  Coming 
Democracy  (Dutton);  Llebknecht,  Militarism  (Huebsch) ; 
Gerard,  My  Four  Years  in  Germany  (Doran);  Curtin,  The 
Land  of  Deepening  Shadow  (Doran) ;  and  Beer,  The  English 
Speaking  Peoples  (Macmillan),  p.  129. 

II.  Mr.  Wilson  Is  also  very  largely  responsible  for  the  fact 
that  the  discussion  of  war  aims  Is  public,  not  secret.  In  his 
own  phrase: 

The  thought  of  the  plain  people  here  and  everywhere  throughout 
the  world,  the  people  who  enjoy  privilege  and  have  very  simple  and 
unsophisticated  standards  of  right  and  wrong,  is  the  air  all  Govern- 
ments must  henceforth  breathe  if  they  would  live.  It  is  in  the  full 
disclosing  light  of  that  thought  that  all  policies  must  be  conceived  and 
executed  in  the  midday  hour  of  the  world's  life.  (Address  to  Congress, 
December  4,  191 7.) 

How  far  did  Mr.  Wilson's  note  of  December  22,  1916,  calling 
for  a  statement  of  war  aims  from  all  the  belligerents,  strengthen 

14 


the  diplomatic  position  of  the  Entente  AlHes  and  force  the 
hand  of  Germany? 

How  far  have  Mr.  Wilson's  utterances  since  the  United 
States  entered  the  war — for  example  his  message  to  Russia 
(May  26,  1918 ;  Current  History,  July,  p.  49) — influenced  Allied 
diplomacy? 

Are  the  so-called  German  "peace  offensives" — ^with  their  use 
of  diplomacy  as  the  hand-maiden  of  military  offensives — in 
consonance  with  the  quotation  from  Mr.  Wilson*s  December 
(191 7)  message? 

BIBLIOGRAPHY 

AcKERMAN,  Germany,  the  Next  Republic  (Doran). 
Beer,  The  English  Speaking  Peoples  (Macmillan). 
CuRTiN,  The  Land  of  Deepening  Shadow  (Doran). 
Fernau,  The  Coming  Democracy  (Dutton). 
Gerard,  My  Four  Years  in  Germany  (Doran). 
LiEBKNECHT,  Militarism  (Huebsch). 

Current  History. 

Nineteenth  Century  a7id  After. 


15 


E,   PRESIDENT  WILSON'S  WAR  AIMS 

I.  Open  covenants  of  peace,  openly  arrived  at,  after  which 
there  shall  be  no  private  international  understandings  of  any 
kind  hut  diplomacy  shall  proceed  always  frankly  and  in  the 
public  view. 

Who,  then,  makes  war?  The  answer  is  to  be  found  in  the  chancel- 
leries of  Europe  among  the  men  who  have  too  long  played  with  human 
lives  as  pawns  in  a  game  of  chess,  who  have  become  so  enmeshed  in 
formulae  and  the  jargon  of  diplomacy  that  they  have  ceased  to  be 
conscious  of  the  poignant  realities  with  which  they  trifle.  And  thus 
war  will  continue  to  be  made  until  the  great  masses  who  are  the  support 
of  professional  schemers  and  dreamers  say  the  word  which  shall  bring 
not  eternal  peace,  for  that  is  impossible,  but  a  determination  that  war 
shall  be  fought  only  in  a  just  and  righteous  cause.  {The  London  Times, 
November  23,  191 2), 

For  illustrations  of  how  some  wars  have  been  brought  about 
see  Cambridge  Modern  History,  vol.  XII.,  chap.  16;  'Diplo- 
matist', Nationalism  and  War  in  the  Near  East  (Oxford),  pp. 
177,  230;  Fernau,  Because  I  Am  a  German  (Dutton),  p.  144; 
and  Dickinson,  The  Choice  Before  Us  (Dodd,  Mead),  p.  248. 

To  what  extent  does  the  quotation  from  The  Times  describe 
the  true  state  of  affairs? 

How  far  can  it  be  said  that  "secret  diplomacy"  is  responsible 
for  the  present  war? 

See  Ponsonby,  Democracy  and  Diplomacy  (Methuen); 
Ponsonby,  'Democracy  and  Publicity  in  Foreign  Affairs'  in 
Towards  a  Lasting  Settlement  (Macmillan);  Neilson,  How 
Diplomats  Make  War  (Huebsch) ;  Morel,  Ten  Years  of  Secret 
Diplomacy  (Labor  Press) ;  Dickinson,  'Democratic  Control  of 
Foreign  Policy',  Atlantic  Monthly,  August,  1916;  Bullard, 
'Democracy  and  Diplomacy',  Atlantic  Monthly,  April,  191 7; 
Macdonell,  'Secret  or  Constructive  Diplomacy',  Contemporary 
Review,  June,  1916;  Brown  'Democracy  and  Diplomacy', 
North  American  Review,  November,  1916;    Hyndman,  'Eng- 

16 


land's  Secret  Diplomacy',  North  American  Review ^  May,  19 16; 
Turner,  'Control  of  Diplomacy*,  The  Nation  (N.  Y.),  June 
8,  1916. 

In  November,  19 16,  Lord  Robert  Cecil,  debating  the  Greek 
situation  said : 

We  are  perfectly  conscious  of  the  many  mistakes  we  make,  of  the 
many  deficiencies  of  which  we  are  guilty,  but  I  cannot  believe  that 
anything  which  waters  down  the  responsibility  of  the  Government  is 
likely  to  improve  it.  We  must  do  what  we  think  right.  We  must 
carry  on  the  government  of  the  country,  badly  I  agree,  but  as  well  as 
we  can  do  it,  and  we  cannot  share  that  responsibility  with  the  House 
of  Commons  or  with  anybody  else — not  during  the  war.  That  seems 
to  me  the  only  position  we  can  take  up. 

The  only  English  paper  to  comment  on  this  was  the  Manchester 
Guardian  which  declared  (November  2,  19 16)  that  Parliament 
had  less  control  than  the  War  Committee  of  the  French  Cham- 
ber and  Senate,  or  the  Budget  Committee  of  the  Reichstag. 

All  that  is  open  to  Parliament  is  to  put  questions,  which  if  they  are 
really  pertinent  are  likely  to  meet  with  impertinent  answers;  or  to 
initiate  on  the  Foreign  Office  vote  a  discussion  which  will  range  over 
every  topic  under  the  sun  that  can  be  associated  with  the  Foreign 
Secretary  and  which  is  as  ineffective  as  it  is  discursive.  {The  New 
Europe,  November  9,  1916.) 

I  think  there  is  in  the  public  mind  a  profound  illusion  as  to  this  so- 
called  secret  diplomacy.  Secret  diplomacy  is  not,  as  I  have  tried  to 
explain,  a  criminal  operation  intended  to  cover  up  dark  transactions 
which  lead  to  division  among  mankind;  it  is  merely  the  practice  of 
ordinary  beings  in  the  ordinar>^  course  of  life  which  they  conduct  to 
the  best  of  their  ability  and  under  the  ordinary  rules  governing  private 
individuals  in  the  doing  of  such  work  as  they  have  got  to  do.  It  is  an 
extension  of  that  to  the  intercourse  between  nations  and  I  do  not  believe 
the  rules  governing  the  two  are  fundamentally  different,  although 
luckily  in  private  life  we  do  not  always  have  to  issue  subsequently 
Blue  Books  explaining  and  recording  all  the  letters  which  have  passed 
between  controversialists,  or  giving  all  the  reasons  which  produced 
unhappy  differences  of  opinion  in  the  domestic  circle.  (Mr.  Balfour 
in  the  House  of  Commons,  August  17,  1917.) 

Discuss  the  issues  raised  in  these  quotations. 
Should  there  be  a  Foreign  Affairs  Committee  in  England  to 
hear  ministers  on  the  conduct  of  foreign  affairs? 

17 


What  are  the  present  arrangements  of  European  countries 
and  the  United  States  for  treating  international  questions? 
(See  text-books  on  government — the  subject  has  been  dis- 
cussed by  eminent  authorities  like  Bagehot,  Bryce,  Sidgwick, 
etc. — and  the  Appendices  in  Ponsonby,  Democracy  and  Dip- 
lomacy, giving  extracts  from  a  Parliamentary  paper  describing 
different  systems  of  controlling  international  affairs — Mis- 
cellaneous, No.  5,  1912,  Cd.  6102.) 

Does  the  arrangement  in  the  United  States — i.  e.,  the  con- 
currence of  the  Senate  in  treaties — insure  that,  in  Mr.  Wilson's 
phrase,  "diplomacy  shall  proceed  always  frankly  and  in  the 
public  view?" 

Cf.  Corwin,  The  F resident's  Control  over  Foreign  Relations 
(Princeton  University  Press);  Wriston,  'Presidential  Special 
Agents  in  Diplomacy*,  American  Political  Science  Review, 
August,  1916;  President  Wilson's  Missions  to  Europe;  his 
exchanges  with  Bernstorff  and  Germany  in  the  submarine 
controversy;  the  negotiations  preceding  the  acquisition  of 
the  Virgin  Islands  (Danish  West  Indies),  and  the  Lansing- 
Ishii  agreement. 

It  is  against  secret  policies  in  which  the  national  liability  may  be 
unlimited  that  the  only  genuine  protest  can  be  raised;  for  such  policies 
are  the  very  negative  of  democracy  and  the  denial  of  the  most  funda- 
mental of  all  popular  rights,  namely  that  the  citizen  shall  know  on 
what  terms  his  country  may  ask  him  to  lay  down  his  life.  This  justi- 
fication of  popular  control  does  not  presuppose  the  publication  of 
diplomatic  negotiations.  On  the  contrary,  it  rests  on  the  assumption 
that  the  People  and  Parliament  will  know  where  to  draw  the  line 
between  necessary  control  in  matters  of  principle  and  the  equally 
necessary  discretionary  freedom  of  the  expert  in  negotiation.  (A.  F. 
Whyte,  The  New  Europe,  August  23,  191 7..) 

Is  this  test  a  valid  and  sufficient  one? 

Was  England's  entrance  into  the  war  contrary  to  the  prin- 
ciple here  set  forth? 

Is  it  advisable  that  there  be  alignments  according  to  po- 
litical parties  on  questions  of  foreign  politics? 

How  far  is  a  more  democratic  diplomacy  dependent  upon  re- 
cruiting the  diplomatic  service  from  men  who  are  in  touch  with 
what  the  masses  in  their  country  are  thinking  and  wanting? 

18 


Have  improved  means  of  communication  made  this  con- 
sideration of  less  importance? 

Is  the  United  States  with  its  "shirt  sleeve"  diplomacy  the 
superior  of  England  in  this  respect? 

See  MacNeill,  Parliament  and  Foreign  Policy  (Council  for 
the  Study  of  International  Relations) ;  The  Foreign  Office  and 
the  Foreign  Service  A  broad  (Ibid.) ;  Satow,  A  Guide  to  Diplo- 
matic Practice  (Longmans);  Ponsonby,  Democracy  and  Dip- 
lomacy; and  especially,  A.  F.  Whyte,  'A  Note  on  Diplomacy', 
The  New  Europe,  May  3,  191 7  and  succeeding  discussions  in 
this  journal  of  a  new  school  for  diplomats. 

And  so  it  was  with  something  like  stupefaction  that  they  [the 
English  people]  discovered,  one  day  in  August,  that  they  were  called 
upon  to  honour  the  obligations  contracted  in  their  name.  (The  War 
and  Democracy,  p.  3.) 

Was  the  surprise  referred  to  a  proof  that  the  Government  of 
the  United  Kingdom  was  undemocratic  or  a  proof  that  the 
great  mass  of  people  had  overlooked  a  duty  of  citizenship  by 
neglecting  the  study  of  foreign  relations? 

Was  anyone  who  had  made  a  study  of  British  foreign  policy 
(from  materials  accessible  to  all)  surprised  at  the  British  Gov- 
ernment's taking  the  course  it  did  in  July  and  August,  19 14? 

That  the  people  of  Europe  have,  in  fact,  even  in  countries  otherwise 
democratic,  no  control  over  foreign  policy  will  hardly  be  disputed. 
But  the  question  remains,  how  does  this  come  about?  In  detail,  the 
answer  will  be  different  in  different  countries,  according  to  the  details 
of  constitutional  machinery  and  parliamentary  procedure.  But  one 
fundamental  fact  applies  generally.  The  people  in  no  country  have 
cared  to  know  or  control.  In  England,  and  no  doubt  in  other  countries, 
it  is  plainly  true  that  the  advent  of  democracy  has  meant,  so  far,  not 
more  but  less  interest  in  foreign  policy. 

But,  after  all,  in  the  English  system  any  matter  can  be  made  public 
and  brought  under  control,  if  the  people  are  determined  to  do  it.  And 
in  England  it  must  be  admitted  that,  if  this  has  not  been  done,  it  is 
because  the  people  have  not  cared  to  do  it.  A  Foreign  Secretary  would 
have  had  to  give  information,  if  it  had  been  made  clear  that  other\vise 
there  would  be  a  vote  of  censure.  And  improvements  in  the  machinery 
of  our  parliamentary  government,  useful  and  necessary  as  they  may 
be,  will  not  ensure  democratic  control  unless  the  people  are  determined 
to  have  it.    Will  they  be  determined?    I  cannot  say.    But  after  the 

19 


experience  of  this  war,  it  does  not  seem  likely  that  they  will  revert  to 
the  illusion  that  foreign  policy  does  not  concern  them.  (Dickinson, 
The  Choice  Before  Us,  pp.  243-244.) 

Do  you  agree  with  this  estimate  that  an  increase  in  educa- 
tion is  more  important  than  an  improvement  in  machinery,  at 
least  so  far  as  England  is  concerned? 

See  Sir  Gilbert  Murray,  'Democratic  Control  of  Foreign 
Policy',  Contemporary  Remew,  February,  1916  (also  chapter  VI 
in' his  Faith,  War,  and  Policy  (Houghton,  Mifflin);  The  War 
and  Democracy,  chapters  I  and  VI,  and  Rogers,  'Popular  Con- 
trol of  Foreign  Policy',  Sewanee  Review,  October,  191 6  (also 
published  at  The  Hague  by  the  Central  Organization  for  a 
Durable  Peace  in  Recueil  des  Rapports  de  V Organization  Centrale 
pour  une  Paix  durable. 

How  do  you  account  for  the  fact  that  the  American  people 
are  less  interested  in  foreign  politics  than  in  domestic  prob- 
lems?   What  is  the  remedy? 

Can  public  opinion  influence  foreign  policy  more  effectively 
in  the  United  States  than  in  France  or  England? 

Should  a  statesman,  like  the  British  Prime  Minister  or  the 
President  of  the  United  States  act 

(a)  as  he  thinks  the  public  at  the  moment  wishes  the  country 
to  act,  or 

(b)  as  he  thinks  the  public  would  wish  the  country  to  act  if 
they  knew  and  took  into  account  all  the  facts  of  the  situa- 
tion in  his  possession,  or 

(c)  as  he  thinks  himself  the  country  ought  to  act? 

What  course  do  you  think  President  Wilson  has  followed? 

Are  any  modifications  in  our  treaty-making  arrangements 
or  administration  of  the  President's  power  over  foreign  affairs 
necessary  in  order  to  have  a  more  popular  control  over  foreign 
policy? 

BIBLIOGRAPHY 

CoRWiN,   The  President's  Control  over  Foreign  Relations  (Princeton 

University  Press). 
Dickinson,  The  Choice  Before  Us  (Dodd,  Mead). 
'Diplomatist',  Nationalism  and  War  in  the  Near  East  (Oxford). 
Fernau,  Because  I  am  a  German  (Dutton). 

20 


Morel,  Ten  Years  of  Secret  Diplomacy  (Labor  Press). 
Murray,  Faith,  War  and  Policy  (Houghton,  Mifflin). 
Neilson,  How  Diplomats  Make  War  (Huebsch). 
PONSONBY,  Democracy  and  Diplomacy  (Methuen). 
Satow,  a  Guide  to  Diplomatic  Practice  (Longmans). 
Cambridge  Modern  History,  Vol.  XIL 
Towards  a  Lasting  Settlement  (Macmillan). 
The  War  and  Democracy  (Macmillan). 

American  Political  Science  Review. 

Atlantic  Monthly. 

Contemporary  Review. 

Council  for  Study  of  International  Relations. 

North  American  Review. 

The  Nation  (New  York). 

TJie  New  Europe. 

Sewanee  Review. 


IL  Absolute  freedom  of  navigation  upon  the  seas,  outside  ter- 
ritorial waters,  alike  in  peace  and  in  war,  except  as  the  seas 
may  be  closed  in  whole  or  in  part  by  international  action  for  the 
enforcement  of  international  covenants. 

The  "freedom  of  the  seas"  has  apparently  given  Germany 
great  concern.  It  is  stressed  by  von  Bethman-HoUweg  in  his 
speech  of  November  9,  1916 ;  it  is  included  in  the  proposals  for 
peace  communicated  to  American  newspapers,  April  18,  191 5 
by  Dr.  Bernhard  Dernburg:  "The  world  is  one  interlocking 
family  of  nations.  World  dominion  is  possible  only  with 
dominion  on  high  seas.  All  the  seas  and  narrows  must  be 
neutralized  permanently  by  common  and  effective  agreement 
guaranteed  by  the  Powers."     (Toward  an  Enduring  Peace, 

p.  134.) 

Exactly  what  does  Germany  mean  by  her  insistence  on  the 
"freedom  of  the  seas?" 

Would  Germany  herself  consider  at  the  settlement  that 
anything  could  be  done  to  make  the  seas  freer  in  time  of  peace 
than  they  were  at  the  beginning  of  the  war.'^ 

Is  it  true  that  the  discussion  about  freedom  of  the  seas 
narrows  to  the  question  of  restriction  on  trade  between 
belligerents  and  neutrals  in  time  of  war? 


"Freedom  of  the  seas"  figured  prominently  in  the  exchanges 
between  the  United  States  and  Germany  over  the  submarine; 
President  Wilson  referred  to  it  several  times  in  addresses  while 
the  United  States  was  a  neutral : 

If  the  United  States  were  permitted  to  initiate  or  assist  in  a  move- 
ment for  peace  it  would  urge  "a  universal  association  of  the  nations  to 
maintain  the  inviolate  security  of  the  highway  of  the  seas  for  the  com- 
mon and  unhindered  use  of  all  the  nations  of  the  world  .  .  .  " 
(At  a  banquet  of  the  League  to  Enforce  Peace,  May  22,  1916.) 

And  the  paths  of  the  sea  must  alike  in  law  and  in  fact  be  free.  The 
freedom  of  the  seas  is  the  sine  qua  non  of  peace,  equality,  and  coopera- 
tion. No  doubt  a  somewhat  radical  reconsideration  of  many  of  the 
rules  of  international  practice  hitherto  thought  to  be  established  may 
be  necessary  in  order  to  make  the  seas  indeed  free  and  common  in 
practically  all  circumstances  for  the  use  of  mankind,  but  the  motive 
for  such  changes  is  convincing  and  compelling.  There  can  be  no  trust 
or  intimacy  between  the  peoples  of  the  world  without  them.  The  free, 
constant,  unthreatened  intercourse  of  nations  is  an  essential  part  of 
the  process  of  peace  and  development.  It  need  not  be  difficult  either 
to  define  or  to  secure  the  freedom  of  the  seas  if  the  governments  of  the 
world  sincerely  desire  to  come  to  an  agreement  concerning  it. 

It  is  a  problem  closely  connected  with  the  limitation  of  naval  arma- 
ments and  the  cooperation  of  the  navies  of  the  world  in  keeping  the 
seas  at  once  free  and  safe.    (Address  to  the  Senate,  January  22,  1917.) 

What  is  the  connection  between  the  freedom  of  the  seas  as 
advocated  by  Mr.  Wilson  and  the  position  of  the  United 
States  that  private  property  should  be  immune  from  naval 
capture? 

(Cf.  Mr.  Wilson's  proposal  and  the  suggestion  of  the  Cen- 
tral Organization  for  a  Durable  Peace  that  "to  facilitate  the 
reduction  of  naval  armaments  the  right  of  capture  will  be 
abolished  and  the  freedom  of  the  sea  assured."  For  the  'Mini- 
mum Programme'  of  the  Central  Organization,  see  Woolf,  The 
Framework  of  a  Lasting  Peace  [Allen  &  Unwin],  p.  63,  and 
Andrews,  'The  Central  Organization  for  a  Durable  Peace', 
Annals  of  the  American  Academy  of  Political  and  Social  Science, 
July,  1916,  p.  16.) 

As  the  United  States  has  for  many  years  advocated  the  exemption 
of  all  private  property  not  contraband  of  war  from  hostile  treatment, 
you  are  authorized  to  propose  to  the  Conference  the  principle  of  ex- 

22 


tending  to  strictly  private  property  at  sea  the  immunity  from  destruc- 
tion or  capture  by  belligerent  powers  which  such  property  already 
enjoys  on  land  as  worthy  of  being  incorporated  in  the  permanent  law 
of  civilized  nations.  (Instructions  to  the  American  delegates  to  the 
First  Hague  Peace  Conference.) 

For  the  eflforts  of  the  United  States  in  support  of  this  pro- 
posal, before  1899  and  at  the  Hague  Conferences,  and  for  the 
policy  of  such  a  departure  as  affecting  the  interests  of  the 
United  States  and  Great  Britain,  see  'Cosmos',  The  Basis  of 
Durable  Peace  (Scribner),  p.  29  ff.;  Scott,  The  Two  Hague 
Peace  Conferences,  (Johns  Hopkins  Press),  vol.  I., Chapter  XV; 
Holls,  The  Peace  Conference  at  the  Hague  (Macmillan),  pp. 
306-321;  Moore,  Digest  of  International  Law  (Government 
Printing  Office),  vol.  VH,  Sec.  1198;  Barclay,  Problems  of 
International  Practice  and  Diplomacy  (Boston  Book  Co.),  pp. 
63-70,  172-179;  Choate,  'Immunity  from  Capture  of  Un- 
offending Property  of  the  Enemy  upon  the  High  Seas',  Amer- 
ican Addresses  at  the  Second  Hague  Peace  Conference  (Ginn) 
pp.  1-25,  (also  published  as  a  pamphlet  of  the  World  Peace 
Foundation,  February-March,  1914) ;  Hirst,  'The  Capture  and 
Destruction  of  Commerce  at  Sea',  International  Conciliation, 
November,  1910;  Mahan,  Armaments  and  Arbitration  (Harper) 
and  The  Interest  of  America  in  Sea  Power  (Little,  Brown). 

For  a  statement  of  the  readiness  of  the  British  Government 
to  consider  proposals  looking  toward  the  immunity  of  private 
property  from  capture,  see  Sir  Edward  Grey's  remarks  in  the 
House  of  Commons,  April  i,  1913  and  May  6,  1914. 

How  far  was  the  Declaration  of  London  a  partial  expression 
of  the  policy? 

For  authorities  see  Bentwick,  The  Declaration  of  London,  and 
Scott,  'The  Declaration  of  London  of  February  26,  1909,' 
American  Journal  of  International  Law,  April  and  July,  19 14. 

To  what  extent  is  it  fair  to  accuse  England  of  having  used  her 
naval  supremacy  in  a  way  corresponding  to  Germany's  "mailed 
fist?"  {e.  g.  in  the  Napoleonic  Wars  and  at  the  time  of  the  block- 
ade of  the  Confederate  ports  during  the  American  Civil  War.) 

See  Egerton,  British  Foreign  Policy  in  Europe  (Macmillan) ; 
Piggott,  The  Neutral  Merchant  (University  of  London  Press). 
For  the  restrictions  by  England  on  neutral  trade  in  the  present 

23 


war,  see  Ciapp,  Economic  Aspects  of  the  War  (Yale) ;  Phillipson, 
International  Law  and  the  Great  War  (Dutton);  numerous 
editorials  and  articles  in  the  American  Journal  of  International 
Law;   Corbett,  The  League  of  Peace  and  a  Free  Sea  (Doran). 

Mr.  Wilson's  reference  to  "freedom  of  the  seas"  is  to  be  welcomed 
on  the  ground  of  its  lucidity  and  breadth  of  definition  ...  No 
other  formula  that  we  have  seen  meets  so  fully  the  stipulations  that 
an  island  Power  like  Great  Britain  is  bound  to  make  to  insure  its  own 
safety  and  that  of  the  Empire  in  time  of  war.  It  seems  to  be  a  natural 
corollary  of  a  League  of  Nations  that  freedom  of  navigation  must  be 
denied  any  nation  that  violates  international  covenants  for  the  main- 
tenance of  peace.  (British  Labor  Manifesto  endorsing  Mr.  Wilson's 
address,  January  9,  1918.) 

Would  Mr.  Wilson  want  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States 
to  relinquish  their  control  of  the  sea  without  its  being  handed 
over  to  a  League  of  Nations? 

On  the  handling  of  naval  power  by  a  League  of  Nations  see 
Angell,  The  World' s  Highway  (Doran) ;  Sidebotham,  The  Free- 
dom of  the  Seas'  in  Towards  a  Lasting  Settlement  and  Atlantic 
Monthly,  August,  1916;  Brailsford,  A  League  of  Nations 
(Macmillan). 

A  blockade  of  the  North  Sea  ought  not  to  be  regarded  as  legitimate. 
Those  who  desire  the  freedom  of  the  seas  must  insist  that  there  is  some 
sea-power  in  existence  which  can  effectively  limit  England's  sole 
supremacy.  Therefore,  it  is  of  the  first  importance  for  us  that  there 
should  be  no  hindrance  to  the  strengthening  of  our  fleet.  We  used  to 
say  before  the  war  that  our  fleet  could  protect  our  oversea  trade  and 
possessions.  This  task  it  has  not  fulfilled  in  the  present  war  but  we 
see  the  need  to  protect  our  coasts  and  provide  a  secure  base  for  our 
submarines.  The  submarine  weapon  must  not  be  struck  out  of  our 
hand.  It  is  the  most  effective  help  in  war  against  a  superior  sea  power, 
and  the  increased  risks  and  uncertainties  that  It  involves  are  well 
calculated  to  prevent  the  outbreak  of  war.  The  submarine  is  the  war- 
ship of  the  small  Power.  So  long  as  England  maintains  her  supremacy 
it  is  indispensable  to  us.  {Europdische  Staats  und  Wirtschaftszeitiing, 
June  2,  1917,  quoted  in  The  New  Europe,  August  9,  1917.) 

Must  measures  be  taken  as  part  of  the  settlement  to  confine 
the  use  of  the  submarine  to  war  vessels  alone? 

Can  there  ever  be  freedom  of  the  seas  while  the  submarine 
is  used  against  commerce? 

24 


Would  it  be  proper  for  a  League  of  Nations  to  use  the  sub- 
marine against  merchant  vessels? 

See  Minor,  'The  Rule  of  Law  Which  Should  Govern  the 
Conduct  of  Submarines  with  Reference  to  Enemy  and  Neutral 
Merchant  Vessels  and  the  Conduct  of  Such  Vessels  Toward 
Submarines',  Proceedings  of  the  American  Society  of  Interna- 
tional Law,  1916;  Rogers,  America's  Case  against  Germa^iy 
(Dutton)  and  authorities  there  cited;  and  Bellot,  'The  Sub- 
marine Menace',  Contemporary  Review,  August,  191 7. 

It  would,  however,  be  highly  important  for  the  freedom  of  shipping 
in  the  future  if  strongly  fortified  naval  bases  or  important  international 
trade  routes,  such  as  England  has  at  Gibraltar,  Malta,  Aden,  Hong- 
kong, the  Falkland  Islands  and  many  other  places,  were  removed. 
(Count  Herding,  January  24,  191 8). 

Discuss  this  suggestion. 

The  necessity  for  naval  vessels  will  continue,  but  among  the  policies 
that  will  be  approved  in  the  peace  conference  that  will  follow  the  war 
there  should  be  incorporated  a  provision  guaranteeing  an  international 
navy  to  enforce  international  decrees.  To  this  international  navy, 
composed  of  separate  naval  establishments  of  all  nations,  each  nation 
should  contribute  in  proportion  to  its  wealth  and  population,  or  upon 
some  plan  to  insure  that  no  nation  can  safely  challenge  the  decree  of 
the  high  international  court  .  .  .It  would  be  a  lasting  calamity 
if,  when  this  war  ends,  there  should  linger  as  a  burden  upon  a  people 
already  heavily  taxed  by  wars  a  competitive  programme  of  costiy 
naval  construction 

This  country  will,  no  doubt,  take  its  proper  place  in  bringing  about 
such  provisions  in  the  peace  treaties  as  will  never  again  constrain  any 
nation  to  adapt  its  naval  programme  to  the  programme  of  some  other 
nation  from  which  there  is  the  compelling  menace  of  possible  and  un- 
provoked attack.  Such  compulsion  is  the  very  negative  of  natural  and 
orderly  development.  It  means  the  tyranny  of  a  programme  dictated 
by  apprehension  rather  than  the  free  choice  of  a  standard  suggested 
by  national  needs  and  supported  by  national  ideals.  An  international 
navy,  on  the  contrary.,  will  make  possible  such  naval  development  as 
each  nation  deems  fitting  for  its  own  people.  It  will  also  serve  the 
"parliament  of  man"  by  providing  a  naval  force  ample  enough  to  give 
validity  to  international  decrees,  and  strong  enough  to  keep  inviolate 
the  peace  of  the  world.  (From  the  report  of  the  Secretars^  of  the  ^oxy 
to  Congress,  December,  191 7.) 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 

AiiGELL,  The  World* s  Highway  (Doran). 

Barclay,  Problems  of  International  Practice  and  Diplomacy  (Boston 
Book  Co.). 

Bourne.  Toward  an  Enduring  Peace  (American  Association  for  Inter- 
national Conciliation). 

Brailsford,  a  League  of  Nations  (Macmillan). 

Clapp,  Economic  Aspects  of  the  War  (Yale). 

CoRBETT,  The  League  of  Peace  and  a  Free  Sea  (Doran). 

'Cosmos*,  The  Basis  of  Durable  Peace  (Scribner). 

Egerton,  British  Foreign  Policy  in  Europe  (Macmillan). 

HoLLS,  The  Peace  Conference  at  the  Hague  (Macmillan). 

Mahan,  Armaments  and  Arbitration  (Harper). 

Mahan,  The  Interest  of  America  in  Sea  Power  (Little,  Brown). 

Moore,  Digest  of  International  Law,  Vol.  VII  (Government  Printing 
Office). 

Phillipson,  International  Law  and  the  Great  War  (Dutton). 

PiGGOTT,  The  Neutral  Merchant  (University  of  London  Press). 

Rogers,  America's  Case  against  Germany  (Dutton). 

Scott,  The  Two  Hague  Conferences  (Johns  Hopkins  Press). 

American  Addresses  at  the  Second  Hague  Peace  Conference  (Ginn). 

American  Journal  of  International  Law. 

Atlantic  Monthly. 

Contemporary  Review. 

International  Conciliation. 

The  New  Europe. 

World  Peace  Foundation. 


TIL  The  removal,  so  far  as  possible,  of  all  economic  harriers 
and  the  establishment  of  an  eqtiality  of  trade  conditions  among 
all  the  nations  consenting  to  the  peace  and  associating  themselves 
for  its  maintenance. 

Cf .  previous  utterances  of  Mr.  Wilson : 

Responsible  statesmen  must  now  everywhere  see,  if  they  never  saw 
before,  that  no  peace  can  rest  securely  upon  political  or  economic 
restrictions  meant  to  benefit  some  nations  and  cripple  or  embarrass 
others,  upon  vindictive  action  of  any  sort  or  any  kind  of  revenge  or 
deliberate  injury.    (Reply  to  the  Pope,  August  27,  1917.) 

It  might  be  impossible  also  in  such  untoward  circumstances  [if  the 
German  people  were  compelled  to  continue  to  live  under  "ambitious 

26 


and  intriguing  masters"]  to  admit  Germany  to  the  free  economic  inter- 
course which  must  inevitably  spring  out  of  the  other  partnerships  of  a 
real  peace.  But  there  would  be  no  aggression  in  that;  and  such  a 
situation,  inevitable  because  of  distrust,  would  in  the  very  nature  of 
things  sooner  or  later  cure  itself  by  processes  which  would  assuredly 
set  in.    (Address  to  Congress,  December  4,  19 17.) 

How  far  are  these  expressions  of  opinion  incompatible  with 
the  Resolutions  of  the  Paris  Economic  Conference? 

For  the  texts  of  the  Resolution  see  Hobson,  The  New  Pro- 
tectionism. (Putnam),  Appendix;  European  Economic  Alliances 
(National  Foreign  Trade  Council) ;  Congressional  Record,  July 
10,  1916,  p.  12284;  and  Current  History,  August,  1916,  p.  928. 
See  also  Clark,  'Shall  There  Be  War  after  the  War?  The 
Economic  Conference  at  Paris,'  American  Journal  of  Inter- 
national Law,  October,  19 17. 

Does  Mr.  Wilson  propose  conditional  economic  war  and  say, 
in  effect,  to  the  German  people  that  they  will  have  nothing 
to  fear  if  they  cease  to  rely  on  the  prowess  of  their  military 
masters? 

Did  the  entrance  of  the  United  States  into  the  war  cause 
the  German  people  to  attach  more  importance  to  the  economic 
war  after  the  war? 

Cf.  the  Reichstag  Resolution:  "No  less  does  the  Reichstag 
reject  all  schemes  which  aim  at  creating  economic  isolation 
and  enmity  among  nations  after  the  war,"  and  the  German 
Chancellor's  statement,  July  19,  1917: 

We  must  by  an  understanding  and  give  and  take  guarantee  the 
conditions  of  existence  of  the  German  Empire  upon  the  Continent  and 
overseas.  Peace  must  build  the  foundation  of  a  lasting  reconciliation, 
prevent  the  nations  from  being  plunged  into  further  enmity  through 
economic  blockades,  and  provide  a  safeguard  that  the  league  in  arms 
of  our  opponents  does  not  develop  into  an  economic  offensive  against  us. 

See  Brailsford,  'The  Reichstag  and  Economic  Peace*,  The 
Fortnightly  Review,  October,  191 7. 

Without  the  existence  of  that  vigorous  industry  which,  after  the 
shutting  in  of  Germany,  we  converted  mainly  into  a  war  industry  we 
should  long  ago  have  lost  this  war.  This  kind  of  war  industry,  however, 
must,  after  peace,  become  relatively  small,  while  millions  of  our  fellow- 
countrymen  will  stream  back  into  Germany  from  the  trenches  without 

27 


finding  sufficient  work  there  and,  in  any  case,  wages  corresponding  to 
the  enormously  increased  prices  of  the  necessaries  of  life.  Imagine,  if 
we  simultaneously  had  to  bear  the  burden  of  taxation  which  must  fall 
on  every  German,  even  the  poor — for  the  greatest  exaction  from  prop- 
erty would  not  be  sufficient  even  remotely  to  meet  it — and  further,  if, 
in  spite  of  the  fallen  value  of  German  money,  we  must  still  buy  the 
most  necessary  raw  materials  and  food  supplies  from  abroad,  not- 
withstanding all  the  political  and  other  hindrances  which  the  situation 
would  produce  for  all!  Can  anyone  in  his  heart  of  hearts  really  believe 
that  under  these  circumstances,  without  an  increase  of  power,  without  an 
indemnity,  without  security,  we  could  avoid  Germany's  ruin?  (Admiral 
Tirpitz  in  December,  1917,  London  Weekly  Times,  December  7,  191 7.) 
The  economic  weapon  must  in  the  case  of  Germany  work  in  part 
through  a  grinding  process  of  attrition,  in  part  through  a  quickening 
among  Germans  of  the  desire  for  peace  and  in  part  through  an  increase 
of  their  fear  of  the  inevitable  economic  penalties  of  prolonging  hostilities. 
It  will  gradually  persuade  them  to  pay  a  higher  price  for  the  opportufiity 
of  negotiating;  and  in  the  end  this  price  can  be  raised  to  any  reasonable 
figure — any  figure,  that  is,  which  does  not  deprive  them  subsequently 
of  the  essentials  of  national  security  and  growth.  (The  New  Republic, 
November  17,  1917.) 

How  far  has  this  position  been  taken  by  English  opinion 
which  advocated  the  Paris  Resolutions  as  a  measure  of  reprisal? 
(See  recent  speeches  of  Lloyd  George  and  the  British  Labor 
Party's  memorandum  on  War  Aims.  International  Concilia- 
tion, No.  123.) 

What  would  have  been  the  prospect  of  carrying  out  suc- 
cessfully the  programme  of  the  Paris  Resolutions? 

Is  it  possible  for  the  Allies  to  accept  or  consider  "the  German 
invitation,  so  bluntly  held  out  to  them  by  the  Chancellor,  to 
enter  into  negotiations  on  the  basis  of  bargaining  for  territory 
in  exchange  for  economic  concessions"? 

Or  are  the  Allied  peace  terms  "absolute,  which  admit  of  no 
bargaining"? 

Is  it  possible  for  the  Allies  to  "invite  the  Central  Powers  to 
make  peace  by  a  certain  date  and  threaten  them  with  post-war 
economic  reprisals  varying  in  duration  or  intensity  according 
to  the  length  of  their  subsequent  resistance?"  (Quotations 
from  The  Economic  Weapon*,  The  New  Europe,  October 
4,  191 7,  which  answers  the  last  question  in  the  negative.) 

28 


Arguing  for  another  economic  conference  to  consider  the  post-war 
situation,  The  New  Europe  says,  however,  that  "it  should  be  made 
clear  to  the  Central  Powers  that  when  they  have  accepted  the 
Allied  terms,  including,  of  course,  full  reparation  by  the  guilty  par- 
ties for  the  ravages  of  war  and  acts  done  in  violation  of  inter- 
national law,  there  is  no  desire  to  penalize  them  further  or  to  hinder 
their  recuperation.  Their  peoples  should  be  offered,  under  these  con- 
ditions, a  proportionate  share  in  the  controlled  supplies  and  ensured 
against  any  legal  restriction  upon  their  legitimate  trading  activities 
at  the  expiration  of  the  period  of  trade  control.  No  pledge  or  action 
by  Governments,  of  course,  can  give  back  to  the  German  trading 
community  the  confidence  of  individual  dealers  or  purchasers  in  the 
countries  they  have  antagonized."    (October  4,  191 7.) 

Should  the  protectionist  movement  after  the  war  have  purely 
an  economic  and  not  a  political  motive? 

What  attitude  should  be  taken  by  Governments  toward  the 
export  of  capital  to  "backward  countries"? 

See  Brailsford,  The  War  of  Steel  and  Gold  (Bell)  and  A 
League  of  Nations,  Chap.  IX  (The  Economics  of  Peace'); 
Lippmann,  The  Stakes  of  Diplomacy  (Holt);  and  Hobson, 
The  New  Protectionism  (Putnam),  Towards  International 
Government  (Allen  and  Unwin),  and  The  Open  Door'  in 
Towards  a  Lasting  Settlement  (Macmillan). 

Is  Mr.  Wilson's  proposal  consistent  with  the  programme  of 
the  League  to  Enforce  Peace  providing  for  the  joint  use  of 
economic  and  military  force? 

What  are  some  of  the  difficulties  of  using  a  boycott  as  a 
substitute  for  war? 

What  would  be  your  own  feeling  if  an  international  boycott 
were  applied  to  the  United  States,  in  a  case  in  which  you 
believed  the  United  States  to  be  in  the  right? 

What  measure  could  be  taken  to  prevent  a  boycotted  coun- 
try from  taking  up  arms  and  precipitating  the  appeal  to  arms 
which  the  boycott  is  proposed  to  prevent? 

Do  you  share  the  view  of  the  importance  of  selfish  economic 
motives  in  politics  that  underlies  such  suggestions  as  the 
boycott  as  a  means  of  preventing  war? 

Are  your  own  political  actions  motived  exclusively,  or 
chiefly,  by  considerations  of  private  economic  interest? 

29 


What  are  the  possibilities  of  an  international  commission 
charged  with  the  supervision  of  international  economic  ques- 
tions arising  out  of  the  war? 

BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Brailsford,  The  War  of  Steel  and  Gold  (Bell). 

Brailsford,  a  League  of  Nations  (Macmillan) . 

HoBSON,  The  New  Protectionism  (Putnam). 

HoBSON,  Towards  International  Government  (Allen  &  Unwin). 

Towards  a  Lasting  Settlement  (Macmillan). 

European  Economic  Alliances  (National  Foreign  Trade  Council). 

American  Journal  of  International  Law. 

Congressional  Record. 

Current  History. 

International  Conciliation. 

The  Fortnightly  Review. 

The  New  Europe. 


IV.  Adequate  guarantees  given  and  taken  that  national  arma- 
ments will  he  reduced  to  the  lowest  point  consistent  with  domestic 
safety. 

Count  Hertling  in  his  speech  of  January  24,1918,  declared  that 

"The  idea  of  limitation  of  armaments  is  entirely  discussable.  The 
financial  position  of  all  European  States  after  the  war  might  most 
eflfectively  promote  a  satisfactory  solution."  Count  von  Bernstorff  in 
December,  1916,  said  that  "it  is  Germany's  desire,  if  the  belligerents 
should  enter  upon  a  discussion  of  peace,  to  confer  upon  the  question  of 
the  limitation  of  armaments.  The  Ambassador  adds  that  in  view  of 
the  German  Government,  a  lasting  peace  can  be  accomplished  only  by 
reducing  the  armaments  of  Europe  to  a  scale  lower  than  that  which 
obtained  before  the  war.  A  rider  is  added  to  this  statement  that  Ger- 
many views  the  international  coalitions  which  existed  before  the  war 
as  objectionable,  and  as  opposed  to  the  maintenance  of  Peace."  (London 
Daily  News,  December  16,  191 6.) 

Are  the  difficulties  in  the  way  of  limiting  armaments  in- 
superable? 

What  methods  might  be  employed  (e.  g.,  reduction  of  the 
term  of  service  in  national  armies,  naval  holidays,  etc.)  ? 

Would  the  agreement,  if  arrived  at,  have  to  be  under  the 
direction  of  an  international  commission? 

30 


How  far  is  the  practicability  of  limiting  armaments  bound 
up  with  the  reorganization  of  Europe  on  a  just  and  stable  basis 
so  that  mutual  trust  will  be  more  and  more  possible? 

Would  you  consider  an  attempt  to  limit  armaments  a  begin- 
ning at  the  wrong  end,  an  attempt  to  remove  a  symptom 
without  effecting  a  cure? 

Before  Germany  can  be  persuaded  to  agree  to  a  limitation 
of  armaments  and  honestly  abide  by  the  treaty,  is  it  necessary 
to  make  it  clear  that  the  German  people  have  nothing  to  fear 
from  the  Entente  Allies? 

Is  a  proposal  for  a  limitation  of  armaments  compatible  with 
the  Paris  Resolutions? 

Would  the  armaments  problem  solve  itself  if  the  causes  of 
friction,  the  grounds  of  fear  were  as  far  as  possible  removed 
by  the  Treaty  of  Settlement? 

See  Barclay,  Problems  of  International  Practice  and  Diplo- 
macy (Boston  Book  Co.),  pp.  123-130;  Scott,  The  Two  Hague 
Peace  Conferences  (Johns  Hopkins  Press),  pp.  654-672; 
Trueblood,  'The  Case  for  the  Limitation  of  Armaments', 
American  Journal  of  International  Law,  October,  1908;  Mead, 
The  Limitation  of  Armaments:  The  Position  of  the  United 
States  at  the  Hague  Conferences  (World  Peace  Foundation); 
Mahan,  Armaments  and  Arbitration  (Harpers),  and  for  the 
Rush-Bagot  Treaty  under  which  the  United  States  and  Canada 
have  not  armed  against  each  other,  Foster,  Limitation  of  Arma- 
ment on  the  Great  Lakes  (Report  of  the  Secretary  of  State  to 
the  President  of  the  United  States,  December,  1892,  Carnegie 
Endowment  for  International  Peace,  Division  of  International 
Law,  Pamphlet  No.  2.) 

For  Britain's  record  on  disarmament  and  proposals  of  a 
naval  holiday,  see  Murray,  The  Foreign  Policy  of  Sir  Edward 
Grey  (Oxford),  p.  no/. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Barclay,  Problems  of  International  Practice  and  Diplomacy  (Boston 

Book  Co.). 
Mahan,  Armaments  and  Arbitration  (Harpers). 
Murray,  The  Foreign  Policy  of  Sir  Edward  Grey  (Oxford). 
Scott,  The  Two  Hague  Peace  Conferences  (Johns  Hopkins  Press). 

31 


American  Journal  of  International  Law. 

Pamphlet  No.  2,  Division  of  International  Law,  Carnegie  Endowment 

for  International  Peace. 
World  Peace  Foundation, 


V.  FreCy  open-minded^  and  absolutely  impartial  adjustment 
of  all  colonial  claims,  based  upon  a  strict  observance  of  the  prin- 
ciple that  in  determining  all  such  questions  of  sovereignty  the 
interests  of  the  populations  concerned  must  have  equal  weight 
with  the  equitable  claims  of  the  government  whose  title  is  to  be 
determined. 

Practical  realization  of  Mr.  Wilson's  principle  in  the  realm  of  reality 
will  encounter  some  difficulties  in  any  case.  I  believe  that  for  the 
present  it  may  be  left  for  England,  which  has  the  greatest  colonial  em- 
pire, to  make  what  she  will  of  this  proposal  of  her  ally.  This  point  of  the 
programme  also  will  have  to  be  discussed  in  due  time,  on  the  recon- 
struction of  the  world's  colonial  possessions,  which  we  also  demand 
absolutely.    (Count  Hertling,  January  24,  1918). 

'       The  first  official  statement  from  England  on  the  German 
►    colonies  was  not  made  until  January  31,   1917.     Previous 
speeches,  the  reply  of  the  Allies  to  the  December  (1916)  peace 
proposals,  and  Mr.  Balfour's  covering  letter  did  not  mention 
the  issue.    But  "speaking  with  knowledge  of  full  responsibility," 
/   Mr.  Long,  the  Colonial  Secretary,  declared  that  "the  German 
(   Colonies  will  never  return  to  German  rule.    It  is  impossible. 
(  Our  overseas  empire  will  never  tolerate  any  suggestion  of  the 
kind."    Before  this  the  silence  on  the  colonial  question  had 
aroused  alarm  in  the  Dominions,  and  Mr.  Long's  pronounce- 
ment was  in  consonance  with  the  changed  policy  on  imperial 
matters  that  had  been  inaugurated  with  the  new  national 
ministry,   marking  as  it  did  a  new  constitutional  doctrine 
(January  31,  1917)- 

As  to  the  German  colonies,  that  is  a  matter  which  must  be  settled 
by  the  Great  International  Peace  Congress.  Let  me  point  out  that 
our  critics  talk  as  if  we  had  annexed  lands  peopled  by  Germans,  as  if 
we  had  subjected  the  Teutonic  people  to  British  rule.  When  you  come 
to  settle  who  shall  be  the  future  trustees  of  these  uncivilized  lands,  you 
must  Lake  into  account  the  sentiments  of  the  people  themselves.    What 

32 


confidence  has  been  inspired  in  their  untutored  minds  by  the  German 
rule  of  which  they  have  had  an  experience.  Whether  they  are  anxious 
to  secure  the  return  of  their  former  masters,  or  whether  they  would 
rather  trust  their  destinies  to  other  and  juster  and — may  I  confidently 
say? — gentler  hands  than  those  which  have  had  the  government  of 
them  up  to  the  present  time?  The  wishes,  the  desires,  and  the  interests 
of  the  people  of  those  countries  must  be  the  dominant  factor  in  settling 
their  future  government.  That  is  the  principle  upon  which  we  are 
proceeding.    (Mr.  Lloyd  George,  December  20,  1917.) 

General  Smuts  in  one  of  his  speeches  described  the  dangers 
that  threatened  the  future  not  only  of  Africa,  but  also  of 
Europe.  The  war  has  shown  that  enormously  valuable  mil- 
itary material  exists  in  the  Black  Continent.  Germany  plotted 
a  grandiose  but  terrible  scheme  for  a  great  Central  African 
Empire  embracing  not  only  the  Cameroons  and  the  East 
African  Colonies  but  also  the  Portuguese  possessions  and  the 
Congo.  The  man  power  would  be  available  to  train  a  powerful 
black  army. 

"It  will  be  a  serious  question,"  said  General  Smuts,  "whether  they 
are  going  to  allow  a  state  of  affairs  like  that  to  be  possible,  and  to  be- 
come a  menace  not  only  to  Africa,  but  perhaps  to  Europe  itself.  I  hope 
that  one  of  the  results  of  this  war  will  be  some  arrangement  or  con- 
vention among  the  nations  interested  in  Central  Africa  by  which  the 
military  training  of  the  natives  in  that  area  will  be  prevented  as  we 
have  prevented  it  in  South  Africa." 

In  this  speech  General  Smuts  did  not  definitely  declare  what  position 
the  Empire  should  assume  with  reference  to  the  colonies  at  the  settle- 
ment. But  he  did  point  out  that  there  is  now  an  open  route  from 
Egypt  to  the  Cape,  and  declared  it  should  be  borne  in  mind  at  the 
conference  that  "having  no  danger  on  the  Atlantic  seaboard  or  on  the 
Indian  seaboard  to  our  very  essential  communications  as  an  Empire" 
was  a  security  that  could  not  readily  be  given  up.  (Smuts,  War-Time 
Speeches,  [Doran]  pp.  81-83.) 

How  far  should  the  United  States  have  a  voice  in  deter- 
mining the  future  of  the  German  colonies? 

If  the  use  of  them  as  "pawns"  violated  Mr.  Wilson's  principle 
should  the  latter  prevail? 

Dr.  Seton-Watson  has  pointed  out  that  there  are  great  dangers  in  a 
policy  that  would  insist  upon  the  retention  of  the  German  colonies, 
for  it  would  justify  Germany's  naval  expansion.    Germany's  sea  trade, 

33 


the  argument  runs,  existed  only  by  the  sufferance  of  the  British  navy. 
"If,  as  a  result  of  the  war,  we  take  from  her  all  that  we  can,  we -shall 
ingrain  this  point  of  view  in  every  German.    We  shall  thus  tend  to 
perpetuate  the  old  situation,  with  its  intolerable  competitive  arma- 
(  ments."    (R.  W.  Seton-Watson,  The  Issues  of  the  War',  The  War  and 
\  Democracy,  p.  243.)    As  to  New  Guinea,  Samoa,  and  German  South- 
^  west  Africa,  Australia,  New  Zealand,  and  South  Africa  will  have  to  be 
consulted.    "It  is  only  in  the  case  of  German  colonies  which  border 
upon  British  Crown  colonies  {e.  g.,  Togoland,   Cameroon,  or  East 
Africa)  that  the  decision  will  rest  entirely  with  the  European  govern- 
ments.   At  this  stage  [191 5]  it  would  be  absurd  to  suggest  even  the  bare 
outlines  of  a  settlement;  but  it  is  well  to  emphasize  the  fact  that  it 
involves  not  only  the  United  Kingdom  but  the  Dominions,  and  that 
on  its  solution  depends  the  future  development  of  the  British  Empire. 
(  In  other  words,  the  war  can  only  result  in  the  downfall  of  the  Empire 
\  or  in  the  achievement  of  Imperial  Federation  and  a  further  democrati- 
j  zation  of  the  Central  Government"  (pp.  243-244). 

(      See  'The  Future  of  the  German  Colonies',  Johnston,  The 

(  Case  for  Retention',  and  Dawson,  The  Case  for  Conditional 

^  Return*,  Contemporary  Review,  September,  1917;   Bond,  The 

Conquest  of  the  Cameroon*,  Contemporary  Review,  May,  1916. 

The  British  Labor  Party  in  its  Memorandum  on  War  Aims,  adopted 

December  28,  1917,  urged  that  "all  the  present  colonies  of  the  European 

Powers  in  tropical  Africa  should  be  transferred  to  the  Super-National 

Authority  and  administered  as  a  single  independent  African  State  with 

its  own  trained  staff."    In  its  message  to  the  Russian  people  issued  on 

January  15th,  the  Labor  Party  said  "that  the  peace  conference  would 

be  well-advised  to  place  all  tropical  Africa  under  uniform  international 

control." 

Would  it  be  wise  to  scrap  existing  administrations  that  work 
well,  as  in  Nigeria  and  Uganda,  for  example,  and  to  attempt 
)  untried  international  administration?  (H.  G.  Wells,  The 
^>  African  Riddle',  The  New  Republic,  February  23,  1918;  The 
f  Resettlement  of  Africa',  New  York  Evening  Post,  February 
[     13,  1918.) 

Would  it  be  possible  to  reenact  the  Berlin  Convention  (1884- 
1885;  for  the  'General  Act'  see  the  American  Journal  of  Inter- 
national Law  [Supplement],  pp.  7-25)  to  declare  freedom  of 
trade,  free  access  for  all  traders  to  ports  and  rivers,  neutrality 
in  the  event  of  a  European  War,  limitation  of  armaments  and 

34 


military  training  to  the  necessities  of  police,  and  to  have 
national  administration  supervised  by  an  international  com- 
mission as  is  suggested  for  the  Dardanelles? 

What  would  have  been  the  possibilities  of  such  an  arrange- 
ment {i.  e.,  a  treaty  with  an  organization  to  enforce  it)  when 
the  Berlin  Convention  was  violated  by  King  Leopold? 

Can  the  value  of  Germany's  colonies  as  "pawns"  be  ignored  ? 

Would  it  be  dangerous  to  leave  Germany  without  any 
colonial  outlet? 

Can  the  "self-determination"  principle  be  applied  in  the 
African  colonies?  Would  the  world  have  confidence  in  the 
decision  of  the  chiefs?  (See  The  Settlement  of  Africa', 
London  Nation,  January  19,  191 8.) 

BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Gibbons,  The  New  Map  of  Africa  (Century). 
Seton-Watson,  The  War  and  Democracy. 
Smuts,  War-Time  Speeches  (Doran). 

American  Journal  of  International  Law. 

Contemporary  Review. 

London  Nation. 

The  New  York  Evening  Post. 

The  New  Republic. 


VI.  The  evacuation  of  all  Russian  territory  and  such  a  settle- 
ment of  all  questions  affecting  Russia  as  will  secure  the  best  and 
freest  cooperation  of  the  other  nations  of  the  world  in  obtaining 
for  her  an  unhampered  and  unembarrassed  opportunity  for  the 
independent  determination  of  her  own  political  development  and 
national  policy  and  assure  her  of  a  sincere  welcome  into  the  society 
of  free  nations  under  institutions  of  her  own  choosing;  and,  more 
than  a  welcome,  assistance  also  of  every  kind  that  she  may  need 
and  may  herself  desire.  The  treatment  accorded  Russia  by  her 
sister  nations  in  the  months  to  come  will  be  the  acid  test  of  their 
good-will,  of  their  comprehension  of  her  needs  as  distinguished  from 
their  own  interests,  and  of  their  intelligent  and  unselfish  sympathy. 

(The  situation  in  Russia  is  so  chaotic  that  only  a  few  ref- 
erences and  questions  will  be  ventured.) 

35 


How  far  is  the  United  States  morally  bound  to  accept  this 
as  one  of  its  war  aims? 

Is  the  policy  of  the  Entente  Allies  partly  to  blame  for  the 
Russian  debacle j  i.  e.,  in  not  making  a  more  definite  and  non- 
imperialistic  statement  of  war  aims?  (See  Brailsford,  *By 
Grace  of  Allied  Policy',  The  New  Republic,  January  19,  1918.) 

For  an  excellent  outline  of  Russian  history  and  contempo- 
rary conditions,  see  The  Round  Table,  December,  1914.  Other 
books  of  interest  are  Russian  Realities  and  Problems  (Cam- 
bridge University  Press) ;  Mavor,  Economic  History  of  Russia 
(Dutton,  2  vols.);  Williams,  Russia  of  the  Russiafis  (Scribner); 
Vinogradoff,  Self-Government  in  Russia  (Holt);  Trotsky,  The 
Bolsheviki  and  Peace  (Boni  &  Liveright);  Sands,  'The  Uk- 
ranians  (Ruthenians)  and  the  War',  Contemporary  Review, 
March,  191 6;  Vinogradoff,  Russia,  the  Psychology  of  a  Nation 
(Oxford  Pamphlets). 

BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Mayor,  Economic  History  of  Russia  (Dutton). 

Trotsky,  The  Bolsheviki  and  Peace  (Boni  &  Liveright). 

Vinogradoff,  Russia,  the  Psychology  of  a  Nation  (Oxford  Pamphlets). 

Vinogradoff,  Self-Government  in  Russia  (Holt). 

Russian  Realities  and  Problems  (Cambridge  University  Press) . 

Williams,  Russia  of  the  Russians  (Scribner) . 

Contemporary  Review, 
The  New  Republic. 
The  Round  Table, 


VH.  Belgium,  the  whole  world  will  agree,  must  be  evacuated 
and  restored,  without  any  attempt  to  limit  the  sovereignty  ivhich 
she  enjoys  in  common  with  all  other  free  nations.  No  other 
single  act  will  serve  as  this  will  serve  to  restore  confidence  among 
the  nations  in  the  laws  which  they  have  themselves  set  and  deter- 
mined for  the  government  of  their  relations  with  one  another. 
Without  this  healing  act  the  whole  structure  and  validity  of  inter- 
national law  is  forever  impaired. 

The  first  requirement,  therefore,  always  put  forward  by  the  British 
Government  and  their  allies,  has  been  the  complete  restoration,  polit- 
ical, territorial,  and  economic,  of  the  independence  of  Belgium  and  such 

36 


reparation  as  can  be  made  for  the  devastation  of  its  towns  and  provinces. 
.  It  is  no  more  and  no  less  than  an  insistence  that  before  there 
can  be  any  hope  for  stable  peace,  this  great  breach  of  the  public  law  of 
Europe  must  be  repudiated  and  so  far  as  possible  repaired. 

Reparation  means  recognition.  Unless  international  right  is  recog- 
nized by  insistence  on  payment  for  injury,  done  in  defiance  of  its 
canons,  it  can  never  be  a  reality.    (Mr.  Lloyd  George,  January  5,  1918.) 

My  predecessor  in  office  repeatedly  declared  that  at  no  time  did  the 
annexation  of  Belgium  to  Germany  form  a  point  in  the  programme  of 
German  policy.  The  Belgian  question  belongs  to  those  questions  the 
details  of  which  are  to  be  settled  by  negotiation  at  the  peace  conference. 

So  long  as  our  opponents  have  not  unreservedly  taken  the  standpoint 
that  the  integrity  of  the  Allies'  territory  can  offer  the  only  possible 
basis  of  peace  discussion,  I  must  adhere  to  the  standpoint  hitherto 
always  adopted  and  refuse  the  removal  in  advance  of  the  Belgium 
affair  from  the  entire  discussion.  (Count  Hertling,  January  24, 
1918.)  But  for  the  views  of  von  Bethmann-Hollweg,  see  Gerard, 
My  Four  Years  in  Germany  (Doran) ;  and  for  the  attitude  of  the  Six 
Industrial  Associations  of  Germany,  which  desire  Belgium  to  "be  sub- 
jected to  the  German  Imperial  Legislation,  both  in  military  and  tariff 
matters,  as  well  as  in  regard  to  currency,  banking,  and  post,"  see 
Headlam,  The  Issue  (Houghton,  Mifflin). 

For  the  history,  government,  and  present  economic  develop- 
ment of  Belgium,  see  Ensor,  Belgium  (Holt:  Home  University 
Library);  Ogg,  The  Governments  of  Europe  (Macmillan), 
Chap.  XXIX,  and  articles  in  the  Encyclopedia  Britannica, 

When  Mr.  Wilson  says  that  there  must  be  no  attempt  to 
limit  Belgium's  sovereignty,  does  he  mean  that  it  is  out  of  the 
question  to  agree  to  neutralization  again?  or  simply  that  Ger- 
many must  retain  no  control  over  her? 

Is  the  restoration  of  Belgium  a  war  aim  more  (a)  because 
it  is  due  the  Belgians  for  their  heroic  resistance?  {h)  because 
Germany  cannot  be  permitted,  as  a  measure  of  safety  on  the 
part  of  the  Entente  Powers,  to  retain  control  over  her?  {c) 
or  because  only  by  restoration  can  public  right  be  enthroned 
as  the  guiding  principle  among  states? 

See  Davis,  What  Europe  Owes  to  Belgium  (Oxford  Pamph- 
lets) and  Fisher,  The  Value  of  Small  States  (Oxford  Pamphlets). 

Should  Belgium  and  Luxemburg  be  joined?  (See  Destree, 
'Belgium  and  Luxemburg',  The  New  Europe,  July  12,  1917.) 

37 


Have  respect  for  treaties  and  the  habit  of  observing  them 
and  international  law  increased  or  decreased  since  1839?-  (See 
Wright,  'The  Legal  Nature  of  Treaties',  American  Journal 
of  International  Law,  July,  191 6.) 

Does  Germany's  conduct  toward  Belgium  raise  a  doubt 
as  to  whether  the  present  rulers  of  Germany  can  ever  be  trusted 
to  keep  a  treaty  unless  convenient  to  them? 

To  have  accepted  mediation  in  1914  would  have  been  for  a  German 
Chancellor  a  notable  act  of  grace:  to  refuse  it  if  a  League  of  Peace  is 
constituted  would  be  a  startling  act  of  perfidy.  It  requires  no  excessive 
exercise  of  faith  to  assume  that  public  opinion,  if  all  the  Great  Powers 
were  pledged  to  adopt  this  pacific  procedure  before  resorting  to  arms, 
would  be  in  each  country  sufficiently  enlightened  to  insist  upon  it, 
and  to  condemn  as  the  aggressors  the  statesmen  who  broke  the  com- 
pact.   (Brailsford,  A  League  of  Nations,  p.  57.) 

Would  the  adhesion  of  America  to  a  League  of  Nations  con- 
tribute to  the  establishment  of  conditions  that  would  prevent 
a  power  from  breaking  treaties  at  its  convenience? 

What  would  have  been  Germany's  probable  attitude  in 
August,  19 14,  if  the  United  States  had  been  bound  to  support 
Belgium? 

There  are  a  number  of  excellent  discussions  of  the.  legal 
status  of  Belgium  at  the  outbreak  of  the  war:  Stowell,  The 
Diplomacy  of  the  War  of  1914  (Houghton,  MifHin) ;  de  Visscher, 
Belgium's  Case:  A  Juridical  Inquiry  (Doran) ;  Baty  and  Mor- 
gan, War,  Its  Conduct  and  Legal  Results  (Dutton) ;  Waxweiler, 
Belgium,  Neutral  and  Loyal  (Putnam);  Phillipson,  Interna- 
tional Law  and  the  Great  War  (Dutton) ;  Renault,  The  First 
Violations  of  International  Law  (Longmans);  Labberton, 
Belgium  and  Germany  (Open  Court);  Fuehr,  The  Neutrality 
of  Belgium  (Funk  &  Wagnalls) ;  Neilson,  How  Diplomats  Make 
War  (Huebsch);  Garner,  'Some  Questions  of  International 
Law  in  the  European  War:  The  Violation  of  Neutral  Terri- 
tory*, American  Journal  of  International  Law,  January,  191 5; 
International  Conciliation,  January,  191 5. 

For  the  obligation  on  the  United  States  to  protest,  see, 
among  many  authorities,  Harvey,  'The  Government  and  the 
War',   North  American  Review,  May,   191 5;    Rogers,  'Presi- 

38 


dent  Wilson's  Neutrality:  An  i\merican  View',  Contemporary 
Review,  May,  1915;  Roosevelt,  America  and  the  World  War 
(Scribner);  'Mr.  Roosevelt's  After  Thought*,  The  New  Repub- 
lic, March  25,  191 6;  'The  Hague  Conventions  and  the  Neu- 
trality of  Belgium  and  Luxemburg',  American  Journal  of 
International  Law,  October,  191 5;  and  a  most  thoughtful 
paper  by  Professor  de  Visscher,  'De  la  Belligerance  dans  ses 
Rapports  avec  la  Violation  de  la  Neutralite',  in  Problems  of 
the  War,  Vol.  II,  p.  93  (Grotius  Society  Papers,  19 16). 

For  Germany's  violations  of  law  in  Belgium,  see,  among 
many  authorities,  Toynbee,  The  German  Terror  in  Belgium 
(Doran)  and  Garner,  'Some  Questions  of  International  Law 
in  the  European  War*,  American  Journal  of  International  Lau\ 
January,  1915,  January  and  July,  1917. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Baty  and  Morgan,  War,  its  Conduct  and  Legal  Results  (Dutton). 

Brailsford,  A  League  of  Nations  (Macmillan). 

Davis,  What  Europe  Owes  to  Belgium  (Oxford  Pamphlets). 

DE  VissCHER,  Belgium's  Case:  A  Juridical  Inquiry  (Doran). 

Ensor,  Belgium  (Holt). 

Fisher,  The  Value  of  Small  States  (Oxford  Pamphlets). 

FuEHR,  The  Neutrality  of  Belgium  (Funk  and  Wagnalls) . 

Gerard,  My  Four  Years  in  Germany  (Doran). 

Headlam,  The  Issue  (Houghton,  Mifflin). 

Labberton,  Belgium  and  Germany  (Open  Court). 

Neilson,  How  Diplomats  Make  War  (Huebsch). 

Ogg,  The  Governments  of  Europe  (Macmillan). 

Phillipson,  International  Law  and  the  Great  War  (Dutton). 

Renault,  The  First  Violation  of  International  Law  (Longmans). 

Stowell,  The  Diplomacy  of  the  War  of  igi4  (Houghton,  Mifflin). 

Toynbee,  The  German  Terror  in  Belgium  (Doran). 

Waxweiler,  Belgium,  Neutral  and  Loyal  (Putnam). 

American  Journal  of  International  Law. 

Contemporary  Review. 

Grotius  Society  Papers,  19 16  (London:  Sweet  &  Maxwell). 

International  Conciliation. 

North  American  Review. 

The  New  Europe. 

The  New  Republic. 

39 


VIII.  All  French  territory  should  be  freed  and  the  invaded 
portions  restored,  and  the  wrong  done  to  France  by  PrusHa  in 
i8yi  in  the  matter  of  Alsace-Lorraine  which  has  unsettled  the 
peace  of  the  world  for  nearly  fifty  years,  should  be  righted  in  order 
that  peace  may  once  more  be  made  secure  in  the  interest  of  all. 

We  mean  to  stand  by  the  French  democracy  to  the  death  in  the 
demand  they  make  for  a  reconsideration  of  the  great  wrong  of  1871, 
when,  without  any  regard  to  the  wishes  of  the  population,  two  French 
provinces  were  torn  from  the  side  of  France  and  incorporated  in  the 
German  Empire.  This  sore  has  poisoned  the  peace  of  Europe  for  half 
a  century,  and,  until  it  is  cured,  healthy  conditions  will  not  have  been 
restored.  There  can  be  no  better  illustration  of  the  folly  and  wicked- 
ness of  using  a  transient  military  success  to  violate  national|nght. 
(Mr.  Lloyd  George,  January  4,  191 8.) 

Do  these  declarations  mean  that  Alsace-Lorraine  must  be 
restored  to  France  or  simply  that  the  problem  will  be  settled 
so  that  the  peace  of  the  world  will  no  longer  be  disturbed? 

How  far  is  the  United  States  obligated  to  support  France 
in  her  demands  for  the  unconditional  return  of  Alsace-Lor- 
raine? 

On  the  general  problem,  see  Putnam,  Alsace  and  Lorraine, 
from  Caesar  to  Kaiser,  58  B.  C.  to  187 1 A .  D.  (Putnam) ;  Hazen, 
Alsace-Lorraine  under  German  Rule  (Holt);  Grant,  Trance 
and  Alsace-Lorraine',  The  Political  Quarterly,  May,  191 5; 
Toynbee,  Nationality  and  the  War  (Dutton),  pp.  40-48  (which 
argues  for  a  plebiscite);  'Cosmos*,  The  Basis  of  Durable 
Peace  (Scribner),  Chap.  VII;  Cawcroft,  'The  Problem  of 
Alsace-Lorraine;  Is  There  a  Democratic  Solution*?  The  World 
Court,  January,  191 8;  Blumenthal,  Alsace-Lorraine  (Putnam); 
von  Billow,  Imperial  Germany  (Dodd);  Gibbons,  The  New 
Map  of  Europe  (Century);  Stoddard,  Present  Day  Europe, 
Its  National  States  of  Mind  (Century) ;  von  Mach,  Germany's 
Point  of  View  (McClurg);  Lauzanne,  'Why  France  Wants 
Alsace-Lorraine',  World^s  Work,  February,  1918;  Whyte,  'The 
Lost  Provinces:  Alsace-Lorraine',  The  New  Europe,  Novem- 
ber 16,  1916;  Holdich,  'New  Political  Boundaries  in  Europe: 
Alsace-Lorraine',  The  New  Europe,  February  8,  1917;  Eccles, 
Alsace-Lorraine  (Oxford  Pamphlets). 

40 


For  special  stress  on  the  natural  resources  of  Alsace-Lorraine 
see  Gregory,  'Geology  and  Strategy',  Contemporary  Review ,  De- 
cember, 1915;  Gardner,  'Lorraine,  the  Test  of  Victory',  World's 
Work,  January,  1918;  and  Brooks,  'The  Real  Problem  of 
Alsace-Lorraine',  North  American  Review,   November,  191 7. 

From  187 1  till  191 1,  Alsace-Lorraine  was  governed  as  a  direct 
appanage  of  the  Imperial  Crown;  in  the  latter  year  it  received  a  con- 
stitution, but  nothing  even  remotely  resembling  self-government. 
Contrary  to  the  expectation  of  most  Germans,  the  two  provinces  have 
not  become  German  in  sentiment;  indeed  the  unconciliatory  methods 
of  Prussia  have  steadily  increased  their  estrangement,  despite  their 
share  in  the  commercial  prosperity  of  the  Empire.  Those  who  know 
intimately  the  undercurrent  of  feeling  in  Alsace-Lorraine  are  unanimous 
in  asserting  that  if  before  last  July  an  impartial  plebiscite,  without 
fear  of  the  consequences,  could  have  been  taken  among  the  inhabitants, 
an  overwhelming  majority  would  have  voted  for  reunion  with  France. 
But  having  once  been  the  battleground  of  the  two  nations  and  living 
in  permanent  dread  of  a  repetition  of  the  tragedy,  the  leaders  of 
political  thought  in  Alsace-Lorraine  favored  a  less  drastic  solution. 
They  knew  that  Germany  would  not  relinquish  her  hold  nor  France 
renounce  her  aspirations  without  another  armed  struggle;  but  they 
believed  that  the  grant  of  real  autonomy  within  the  Empire,  such  as 
would  place  them  on  an  equal  footing  with  Wiirtemberg  or  Baden, 
would  render  their  position  tolerable,  and  by  removing  the  chief  source 
of  friction  between  France  and  Germany,  create  the  ground  work  for 
more  cordial  and  lasting  relations  between  Germany  and  the  two 
Western  Powers.  (Dr.  R.  W.  Seton-Watson  in  The  War  and  Democ- 
racy, pp.  244-246.) 

For  the  status  of  Alsace-Lorraine  in  the  German  Empire 
see  Lowell,  Governments  and  Parties  in  Continental  Europe 
(Harvard  University  Press),  or  Ogg,  The  Governments  of 
Europe  (Macmillan). 

"What  we  have  gained  by  arms  in  six  months  we  shall  have  to  defend 
by  arms  for  fifty  years,"  said  General  von  Moltke  after  the  Franco- 
Prussian  War.  Prince  von  Billow's  opinion  {Imperial  Germany,  p.  69) 
was  as  follows:  "The  irreconcilability  of  France  is  a  factor  that  we 
must  reckon  with  in  our  political  calculations.  It  seems  to  be  weakness 
to  entertain  the  hope  of  a  real  and  sincere  reconciliation  with  France, 
so  long  as  we  have  no  intention  of  giving  up  Alsace-Lorraine.  And 
there  is  no  such  intention  in  Germany." 

41 


How  far  would  these  considerations  apply  in  the  case  of  a 
forcible  re-annexation  by  France? 

Would  the  unconditional  return  of  Alsace-Lorraine  to  France 
be  inconsistent  with  Mr.  Wilson's  principle  regarding  the  self- 
determination  of  free  peoples? 

Would  this  principle  require  that  Alsace-Lorraine  be 
allowed,  "under  the  protection  of  the  super-national  authority 
or  League  of  Nations  freely  to  decide  what  shall  be  their  future 
political  position"?  ('Memorandum  on  War  Aims  of  the 
British  Labor  Party'.    International  Conciliation,  No.  123.) 

What  would  be  the  difficulties  of  a  referendum  in  Alsace- 
Lorraine? 

Assuming  that  it  could  not  be  conducted  under  French  or 
German  auspices,  would  an  international  commission  be  able 
to  secure  a  free  decision? 

Would  people  sent  in  by  Germany  be  permitted  to  vote  and 
would  the  plebiscite  be  delayed  until  the  return  of  the  exiles 
to  France  and  elsewhere? 

Would  either  France  or  Germany  peaceably  accept  an 
adverse  decision? 

See  Toynbee,  Nationality  and  the  War,  p.  40. 

Alsace-Lorraine  falls  into  three  well-marked  areas  : 

(i)  Western  Lorraine  (the  Metz  region)  is  Catholic  and  French  by 
choice,  and  language,  but  it  contains  only  fifteen  per  cent,  of  the  total 
population  of  the  Reichsland.  (2)  Northeastern  Lorraine,  on  the  other 
hand,  is  mainly  German  and  Protestant,  and,  together  with  the  north- 
west district  of  Alsace,  would  certainly  prefer  to  be  German.  (3)  About 
the  real  opinion  of  the  greater  part  of  Alsace,  German  by  race,  Catholic 
by  religion,  but  with  a  persistent  French  tradition,  no  one  can  dog- 
matize.   (Brailsford,  A  League  of  Nations,  pp.  1 15-125.) 

Would  the  proposed  plebiscite  have  to  give  these  districts 
an  opportunity  to  decide  for  themselves? 

Should  the  fact  that  economic  resources  do  not  follow  the 
lines  of  popular  feeling  be  taken  into  consideration? 

Would  it  be  possible  to  neutralize  Alsace-Lorraine  under  a 
guarantee  of  the  powers  or  under  an  international  commission? 
Or  simply  to  give  it  independence?  Or  to  form  it  into  a  federa- 
tion with  Belgium  that  would  make  a  stretch  of  neutralized 
territory  from  the  North  Sea  to  Italy? 

42 


Cf.  the  status  of  Savoy,  a  neutralized  province  of  France, 
and  the  cession  of  the  Ionian  Islands  to  Greece  in  1864.  See 
Cambridge  Modern  History,  Vol.  XI,  p.  642;  Lawrence,  Prin- 
ciples of  International  Law  (Heath),  Sees.  246-248,  and  Fayle, 
The  Great  Settlement  (Duffield),  pp.  148-153. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Blxmenthal,  Alsace-Lorraine  (Putnam). 

Brailsford,  a  League  of  Nations  (Macmillan). 

'Cosmos',  The  Basis  of  Durable  Peace  (Scribners). 

EccLES,  Alsace-Lorraine  (Oxford  Pamphlets). 

Fayle,  The  Great  Settlement  (Duffield). 

Gibbons,  The  New  Map  of  Europe  (Century). 

Hazen,  Alsace-Lorraine  under  German  Ride  (Holt). 

Lawrence,  Principles  of  International  Law  (Heath). 

Lowell,  Governments  and  Parties  in  Continental  Europe. 

Ogg,  Governments  of  Europe  (Macmillan). 

Putnam,  Alsace  and  Lorraine,  from  Caesar  to  Kaiser  (Putnam). 

Seton-Watson,  The  War  and  Democracy. 

Stoddard,  Present-Day  Europe,  Its  National  States  of  Mind  {(Zenixxvy) , 

Toynbee,  Nationality  and  the  War  (Dutton). 

von  BiJLOW,  Imperial  Germany  (Dodd). 

VON  Mach,  Germany's  Point  of  View  (McCkirg). 

Cambridge  Modern  History. 

Contemporary  Review. 
North  American  Review. 
Political  Quarterly. 
The  New  Europe. 
The  World  Cotirt. 
World's  Work. 


IX.   A  readjustment  of  the  frontiers  of  Italy  should  be  effected 
along  clearly  recognizable  lines  of  nationality. 

What  influence  has  the  quarrel  with  the  Papacy  had  upon 
Italy's  political  development? 

What  are  the  problems  that  the  South  of  Italy  presents? 

Why  did  Italy  join  the  Triple  Alliance? 

Why  did  she  leave  it? 

43 


Consider  the  justification  (suggesting  any  modifications  tliat 
seem  good)  of  the  Italian  claim  to  control  both  shores  of  the 
Adriatic,  from  the  point  of  view  {a)  of  nationality,  (&)  of  strate- 
gic security,  and  (c)  of  the  future  peace  of  the  world. 

On  Italian  history,  see  King  and  Okey,  Italy  of  Today 
(Nisbet) ;  Seton- Watson,  The  Balkans,  Italy  and  the  Adriatic 
(Nisbet);  Coolidge,  The  Origins  of  the  Triple  Alliance  (Scrib- 
ner) ;  Wallace,  Greater  Italy  (Scribner) . 

The  terms  of  the  Triple  Alliance  have  not  been  published 
but  Articles  I,  III,  IV,  and  VII  are  given  in  the  second  Austro- 
Htmgarian  Red  Book  as  follows: 

Article  I.  The  High  Contracting  Parties  mutually  promise  peace  and 
friendship,  and  shall  not  enter  into  any  alliance  or  engagement  directed 
against  any  one  of  their  respective  States. 

They  bind  themselves  to  proceed  to  negotiations  on  such  political  and 
economic  questions  of  a  general  nature  as  may  arise;  and,  moreover, 
promise  their  mutual  support  within  the  scope  of  their  own  interests. 

Article  III.  If  one  or  two  of  the  High  Contracting  Parties  should  be 
attacked  without  direct  provocation  on  their  part,  and  be  engaged  in  war 
with  two  or  several  great  Powers  not  signatory  to  this  Treaty,  the  casus 
foederis  shall  apply  simultaneously  to  all  the  High  Contracting  Parties. 

Article  IV.  In  the  event  that  a  Great  Power  not  signatory  to  this 
Treaty  should  menace  the  safety  of  the  States  of  one  of  the  High  Con- 
tracting Parties,  and  that  the  menaced  Party  should  be  forced  to  make 
war  on  that  Power,  the  two  others  bind  themselves  to  observe  toward 
their  ally  a  benevolent  neutrality.  Each  one  of  them  in  that  case 
reserves  to  herself  the  right  to  participate  in  the  war,  if  she  should 
consider  it  appropriate  to  make  common  cause  with  her  Ally. 

Article  VII.  Austria-Hungary  and  Italy,  being  desirous  solely  that 
the  territorial  status  quo  in  the  near  East  be  maintained  as  much  as 
possible,  pledge  themselves  to  exert  their  influence  to  prevent  all  terri- 
torial modification  which  may  prove  detrimental  to  one  or  the  other 
of  the  Powers  signatory  to  this  Treaty.  To  that  end  they  shall  com- 
municate to  one  another  all  such  information  as  may  be  suitable  for 
their  mutual  enlightenment,  concerning  their  own  dispositions  as  well 
as  those  of  other  Powers. 

Should,  however,  the  status  quo  in  the  regions  of  the  Balkans,  or 
of  the  Turkish  Coasts  and  islands  in  the  Adriatic  and  Aegean  Seas,  in 
the  course  of  events  become  impossible ;  and  should  Austria-Hungary 
or  Italy  be  placed  under  the  necessity,  either  by  the  action  of  a  third 
Power  or  otherwise,  to  modify  that  status  quo  by  a  temporary  or  per- 

44 


manent  occupation  on  their  part,  such  occupation  shall  take  place  only 
after  a  previous  agreement  has  been  made  between  the  two  Powers, 
based  on  the  principle  of  reciprocal  compensation  for  all  advantages, 
territorial  or  otherwise,  which  either  of  them  may  obtain  beyond  the 
present  status  quo,  a  compensation  which  shall  satisfy  the  legitimate 
interests  and  aspirations  of  both  Parties.  {Austro-Hungarian  Red 
Book  [No.  2],  Appendix,  Nos.  i,  14,  15,  16;  Scott  [ed.],  Diplomatic 
Documents  Relative  to  the  European  War,  pp.  335,  346  [Oxford].) 

For  Italy's  refusal  to  stay  in  the  Triple  Alliance  and  her 
declaration  of  war  on  Austria-Hungary,  see  the  Austro-Hun- 
garian Red  Books,  and  Italy's  Green  Book  {International  Con- 
ciliation, No.  93,  August,  1915)  which  will  be  found  in  Scott's 
edition  of  the  diplomatic  correspondence.  See  also  Felling, 
Italian  Policy  since  1870  (Oxford  Pamphlets) ;  Hope,  Why 
Italy  is  with  the  Allies  (Clay);  'Civis  Italicus',  Italy  and  the 
Jugo-Slav  Peoples  (Council  for  the  Study  of  International 
Relations);  Rigano,"r/^e  War  and  the  Settlement:  An  Italian 
View  (Council  for  the  Study  of  International  Relations). 

A  secret  treaty  between  Italy,  Russia,  Great  Britain, 
and  France  signed  on  May  9,  1915,  two  weeks  before  Italy's 
entrance  into  the  war,  promises  Italy  territorial  compensation 
for  her  military  assistance.  The  Treaty  was  among  the 
secret  engagements  made  public  by  the  Bolsheviki  and  a 
translation  was  published  by  The  New  Europe  (See  Current 
History,  March,  1918,  p.  494;  the  treaties  also  appeared  in 
the  New  York  Evening  Post,  January  25,  26  and  28,  191 8). 

Would  the  changes  contemplated  by  this  treaty  be  more 
than  "a  readjustment  of  the  frontiers  of  Italy  .  .  .  along 
clearly  recognizable  lines  of  nationality"? 

See  Toynbee,  Nationality  and  the  War  (Button),  Chap.  V; 
Gibbons,  The  New  Map  of  Europe  (Century),  Chap.  VII, 
XIII;  Gibbons,  The  Reconstruction  of  Poland  and  the  Near 
East,  Chap.  IV;  Taylor,  The  Future  of  the  Southern  Slavs, 
Chap.  IV,  esp.  pp.  150-160;  Dominian,  'The  Nationality  Map 
of  Europe',  A  League  of  Nations,  December,  191 7  (World 
Peace  Foundation) ;  Murri,  'Italy  and  England',  Contemporary 
Review,  November,  1915;  'O.  de  L.',  'Albania,  Austria,  Italy, 
Essad',  Contemporary  Review,  August,  1917;  and  the  provi- 
sions of  the  secret  treaty. 

45 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 

CooLiDGE,  The  Origins  of  the  Triple  Alliance  (Scribner). 

Feiling,  Italian  Policy  since  1870  (Oxford  Pamphlets). 

Gibbons,  The  New  Map  oj  Europe  (Century). 

Gibbons,  The  Reconstruction  of  Poland  and  the  Near  East  (Century). 

Hope,  Why  Italy  is  with  the  Allies  (Clay). 

King  and  Okey,  Italy  of  Today  (Nisbet). 

Scott,  Diplomatic  Documents  Relative  to  the  European  War  (Oxford). 

Seton-Watson,  The  Balkans,  Italy  and  the  Adriatic  (Nisbet). 

Taylor,  The  Future  of  the  Southern  Slavs  (Dodd,  Mead). 

Toynbee,  Nationality  and  the  War  (Dutton). 

Wallace,  Greater  Italy  (Scribner) . 

Contemporary  Review. 

Council  for  the  Study  of  International  Relations. 

Current  History. 

International  Conciliation. 

The  New  Europe. 

World  Peace  Foundation. 


X.  The  peoples  of  Austria-Hungary,  whose  place  among  the 
nations  we  wish  to  see  safeguarded  and  assured,  should  he  accorded 
the  freest  opportunity  of  autonomous  development. 

What  constitutes  a  nation?  Are  "race"  and  "nationality" 
different?    (See  The  War  and  Democracy,  Chap.  II.) 

What  constitutes  a  state? 

Is  the  British  Empire  a  state  or  many  states,  or  both? 
Which  is  the  German  Empire?  The  Austro-Hungarian  Empire? 

What  holds  a  state  together?  How  is  it  that  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  state  can  induce  Southern  Slavs  and  Italians  to 
fight  against  the  Allies  who  include  in  their  alliance  Serbia 
and  Montenegro  and  Italy? 

What  is  the  relative  importance  of  the  following  factors  of 
political  cohesion:  common  nationality,  loyalty  to  a  dynasty 
{e.  g.,  in  Prussia),  economic  convenience  (e.  g.,  Austria-Hun- 
gary), geographical  unity  {e.  g.,  Switzerland)? 

Should  each  nationality  form  a  separate  sovereign  state? 
or  are  the  claims  of  nationality  adequately  met  by  "home  rule" 
in  some  sort  of  federal  framework?    See  The  War  and  Democ^ 

46 


racy;  Toynbee,  Nationality  and  the  War;  Fayle,  The  Great 
Settlement;  Brailsford,  A  Leagtie  of  Nations,  Chap.  IV;  and 
Dominian,  The  Frontiers  of  Langtmge  and  Nationality  in 
Europe  (Holt). 

Consider  the  problems  raised  by  the  fact  that  members  of 
different  races  are  at  present  united  under  the  Austrian  Em- 
pire. Consider  the  relative  advantages  and  disadvantages  of 
dismemberment  as  compared  with  federation  (a)  from  the 
point  of  view  of  nationality,  (6)  in  relation  to  the  formation 
of  a  League  of  Nations  after  the  war. 

See  Steed,  The  Hapsburg  Monarchy  (Constable);  Seton- 
Watson,  Racial  Problems  in  Hungary,  Corruption  and  Reform 
in  Hungary,  The  Southern  Slav  Question  (Constable) ;  Gibbons, 
The  New  Map  of  Europe  (Century);  Beaven,  Austrian  Policy 
Since  1867  (Oxford  Pamphlets). 

What  is  your  explanation  of  the  survival  of  the  Austrian 
Empire? 

How  far  is  the  continued  control  by  Germany  of  Austria- 
Hungary  and  the  oppression  of  subject  races  essential  to  "Mit- 
tel-Europa"? 

See  Naumann,  Central  Europe  (Knopf) ;  Cheradame,  Pan- 
Germany:  The  Disease  and  the  Cure  (Atlantic  Monthly  Press) ; 
Brailsford,  'The  Shaping  of  Mid-Europe',  Contemporary  Re- 
view, March,  1916;  Pergler,  'Should  Austria-Hungary  Exist?', 
Yale  Review,  January,  191 8. 

Do  you  think  that  Mr.  Wilson's  professions  of  friendship  for 
Austria-Hungary  (see  his  messages  of  December  4, 191 7,  and  Feb- 
ruary 11,1918)  will  wean  Austria-Hungary  from  Germany  and 
make  her  willing  to  consent  to  recognize  subject  nationalities? 

What  would  be  the  probable  result  if  Austria-Hungary 
acted  in  accordance  with  the  following  principles  (Mr.  Wil- 
son's address  of  February  11,  1918) : 

First,  that  each  part  of  the  final  settlement  must  be  based  upon  the 
essential  justice  of  that  particular  case  and  upon  such  adjustments  as 
are  most  likely  to  bring  a  peace  that  will  be  permanent; 

Second,  that  peoples  and  provinces  are  not  to  be  bartered  about 
from  sovereignty  to  sovereignty  as  if  they  were  mere  chattels  and 
pawns  in  a  game,  even  the  great  game,  now  forever  discredited,  of  the 
balance  of  power;  but  that 

47 


Third,  every  territorial  settlement  involved  in  this  war  must  be 
made  in  the  interest  and  for  the  benefit  of  the  populations  concernied, 
and  not  as  part  of  any  mere  adjustment  or  compromise  of  claims 
amongst  rival  states,  and 

Fourth,  that  all  well  defined  national  aspirations  shall  be  accorded 
the  utmost  satisfaction  that  can  be  accorded  them  without  introducing 
new  or  perpetuating  old  elements  of  discord  and  antagonism  that 
would  be  likely  in  time  to  break  the  peace  of  Europe,  and  consequently 
of  the  world. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Beaven,  Austrian  Policy  since  1867  (Oxford  Pamphlets). 

Brailsford,  a  League  of  Nations  (Macmillan). 

Cheradame,    Pan-Germany:     The   Disease   and   the    Cure    (Atlantic 

Monthly  Press). 
Domini  AN,  The  Frontiers  of  Language  and  Nationality  in  Europe  (Holt). 
Fayle,  The  Great  Settlement  (Duffield). 
Gibbons,  The  New  Map  of  Europe  (Century). 
Naumann,  Central  Europe  (Knopf). 

Seton-Watson,  Racial  Problems  in  Hungary,  (Constable). 
Seton- Watson,  Corruption  and  Reform  in  Hungary,  (Constable). 
Seton-Watson,  The  Southern  Slav  Question  (Constable). 
Steed,  The  Hapsburg  Monarchy  (Constable). 
ToYNBEE,  Nationality  and  the  War  (Dutton). 
The  War  and  Democracy  (Macmillan). 

Contemporary  Review. 
Yale  Review. 


XI.  Rumania,  Serbia,  and  Montenegro  should  be  evacuated; 
occupied  territories  restored;  Serbia  accorded  free  and  secure 
access  to  the  sea;  and  the  relations  of  the  several  Balkan  states 
to  one  another  determined  hy  friendly  counsel  along  historically 
established  lines  of  allegiance  and  nationality;  and  international 
guarantees  of  the  political  and  economic  independence  and  terri- 
torial integrity  of  the  several  Balkan  states  should  be  entered  into. 

On  Balkan  problems  generally  see  Buxton  (Noel),  The  War 
and  the  Balkans  (Allen);  Seton-Watson,  The  Southern  Slav 
Question  and  the  Hapsburg  Monarchy  (Constable);  Hogarth, 
The  Near  East  (Oxford);  Forbes,  Mitrany,  and  Toynbee, 
The  Balkans  (Oxford);    'Diplomatist',  Nationality  and  War 

48 


in  the  Near  East  (Oxford) ;  Toynbee,  Nationality  and  the  War 
(Dutton) ;  Gibbons,  The  New  Map  of  Europe  (Century) ;  and 
Marriott,  The  Eastern  Question  (Oxford). 

With  particular  reference  to  Rumania,  see  Washburn, 
The  Tragedy  of  Rumania',  Atlantic  Monthly,  December,  1917; 
Leeper,  The  Justice  of  Rumania's  Cause  (Doran);  Mitrany, 
Rumania:  Her  History  and  Politics  (Oxford  Pamphlets);  the 
secret  memorandum  made  public  by  the  Bolsheviki  {New  York 
Evening  Post,  January  25,  191 8),  and  many  important  articles 
in  The  New  Europe,  some  of  them  by  the  Rumanian  statesman, 
Take  Jonescu. 

On  Serbia,  see  Chirol,  Serbia  and  the  Serbs  (Oxford  Pam- 
phlets) ;  Velimirovic,  Serbia's  Place  in  Human  History  (Coun- 
cil for  the  Study  of  International  Relations);  Temperley, 
A  History  of  Serbia  (Bell) ;  Taylor,  The  Future  of  the  Southern 
Slavs  (Dodd,  Mead). 

Serbia  is  the  route  to  the  East  ...  It  cannot  be  repeated  too 
often  that  Serbia  is  the  chief  obstacle  to  those  plans  of  political  pre- 
domination from  Berlin  to  Bagdad,  which  lie  at  the  back  of  Germany's 
mind  in  the  world-war;  that  her  services  to  the  common  cause  entitle 
her  to  be  treated  on  a  common  footing  with  all  the  other  allies;  and 
that  just  as  Serbia  is  the  route  from  the  West  to  Constantinople  and 
Salonica  so  she  is  the  route,  as  in  Turkish  days,  from  Eastern  Europe 
to  Vienna  and  Berlin.  Sooner  or  later  it  will  become  clear,  even  to  the 
man  in  the  street,  that  the  way  to  Berlin  lies  not  through  Belgium  but 
through  the  Balkans  and  the  great  Hungarian  plains.  (Seton-Watson, 
The  Balkans,  Italy  and  the  Adriatic,  pp.  31-32.) 

Questions  suggested  with  particular  reference  to  Italy  and 
Austria-Hungary  are  appropriate  In  considering  the  Balkans. 
The  circumstances  surrounding  the  entry  of  Rumania,  etc., 
into  the  war  can  be  traced  in  Current  History  or  in  some  more 
careful  record  like  Nelson's  History  of  the  War,  written  by 
Colonel  John  Buchan  (Nelson).  The  following  general  ques- 
tions, however,  may  be  profitably  discussed: 

1.  The  causes  of  the  Crimean,  Russo-Turkish,  and  first  and 

and  second  Balkan  Wars. 

2.  The  defects  of  the  Balkan  settlements  of  1 856, 1 878,  and  1913. 

3.  The  problems  of  Macedonia  and  Albania. 

4.  The  possibilities  of  a  Southern  Slav  United  Kingdom. 

49 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 

BucHAN,  History  of  the  War  (Nelson). 

Buxton,  The  War  and  the  Balkans  (Allen). 

Chirol,  Serbia  and  the  Serbs  (Oxford  Pamphlets). 

'Diplomatist*,  Nationality  and  War  in  the  Near  East  (Oxford). 

Forbes,  Mitrany,  and  Toynbee,  The  Balkans  (Oxford). 

Gibbons,  The  New  Map  of  Europe  (Century). 

Gibbons,  The  Reconstruction  of  Poland  and  the  Near  East  (Century). 

Hogarth,  The  Near  East  (Oxford). 

Leeper,  The  Justice  of  Rumania's  Cause  (Doran). 

Marriott,  The  Eastern  Question  (Oxford). 

Mitrany,  Rumania:  Her  History  and  Politics  (Oxford  Pamphlets). 

Seton-Watson,  The  Balkans,  Italy  and  the  Adriatic  (Nisbet). 

Seton-Watson,  The  Southern  Slav  Question  and  the  Hapsburg  Monarchy 

(Constable). 
Taylor,  The  Future  of  the  Southern  Slavs  (Dodd,  Mead). 
Temperley,  a  History  of  Serbia  (Bell). 
Toynbee,  Nationality  and  the  War  (Dutton). 

Atlantic  Monthly. 

Current  History. 

New  York  Evening  Post. 


XII.  The  Turkish  portions  of  the  present  Ottoman  Empire 
should  be  assured  a  secure  sovereignty,  but  the  other  nationalities 
which  are  now  under  Turkish  rule  should  be  assured  an  undoubted 
security  of  life  and  an  absolutely  unmolested  opportunity  of 
autonomous  development,  and  the  Dardanelles  should  be  perma- 
nently opened  as  a  free  passage  to  the  ships  and  commerce  of  all 
nations  under  international  guarantees. 

See  Toynbee,  Turkey:  A  Past  and  Future  (Doran) ;  Urquhart, 
The  Eastern  Question  (Oxford  Pamphlets) ;  Turkey  in  Europe 
and  Asia  (Oxford  Pamphlets);  Gibbons,  The  Reconstruction 
of  Poland  and  the  Near  East  (Century),  Chaps.  II  and  III. 

The  Entente  was  officially  pledged  by  the  treaties  with 
Russia  (made  public  by  the  Bolsheviki ;  see  The  New  York  Evening 
Po5/,  January,  I9i8,and  The  New  Europe,  December,  191 7)  to 
drive  Turkey  out  of  Europe  and  to  give  Russia  Constantinople. 
(See  the  reply  of  the  Allies  to  Mr.  Wilson's  note,  January, 
1917).    With  the  coming  of  the  Russian  revolution  these  im- 

50 


perialist  aims  were  abandoned  (see  the  speeches  and  docu- 
ments in  Current  History)  and  in  his  address  of  January  5, 
1 91 8,  Mr.  Lloyd  George  declared: 

While  we  do  not  challenge  the  maintenance  of  the  Turkish  Empire 
in  the  homelands  of  the  Turkish  race  with  its  capital  at  Constanti- 
nople, the  passage  between  the  Mediterranean  and  the  Black  Sea  being 
internationalized  and  neutralized,  Arabia,  Armenia,  Mesopotamia, 
Syria,  and  Palestine,  are,  in  our  judgment,  entitled  to  a  recognition  of 
their  separate  national  conditions. 

What  would  have  been  the  probable  attitude  of  the  United 
States  if  Russia  had  continued  to  claim  Constantinople? 

For  the  suggestion  that  the  United  States  might  undertake 
the  administration  of  the  Straits,  see  Toynbee,  Nationality  and 
the  War  (Dutton) ;  Woolf ,  The  Future  of  Constantinople  (Allen 
&  Unwin);  and  Buxton  (Noel),  The  Destiny  of  the  Turkish 
Straits',  Contemporary  Review,  June,  191 7.  For  a  history  of 
previous  attempts  at  international  administration,  see  Woolf, 
International  Government  (Brentano),  and  for  the  interesting 
case  of  Shanghai,  Moore,  Digest  of  International  Law  (Govern- 
ment Printing  Office),  Vol.  II,  p.  648/. 

On  the  whole  problem  of  backward  states  see  Lippmann, 
The  Stakes  of  Diplomacy  (Holt). 

BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Gibbons,  The  Reconstruction  of  Poland  and  the  Near  East  (Century). 
Lippmann,  The  Stakes  of  Diplomacy  (Holt). 
Toynbee,  Nationality  and  the  War  (Dutton). 
Toynbee,  Turkey:  A  Past  and  Future  (Doran). 
Urquhart,  The  Eastern  Question  (Oxford  Pamphlets). 

Turkey  in  Europe  and  Asia  (Oxford  Pamphlets). 
Woolf,  The  Future  of  Constantinople  (Allen  and  Unwin). 

Contemporary  Review. 

Current  History. 

The  New  Europe. 

The  New  York  Evenmg  Post. 


XIII.  An  independent  Polish  state  should  he  erected  which 
should  include  the  territories  inhabited  hy  indisputably  Polish 
populations,  which  should  he  assured  a  free  and  secure  access 

51 


to  the  sea,  and  whose  political  and  economic  independence  and 
territorial  integrity  should  he  guaranteed  by  international  covenant. 

Illustrate  from  the  case  of  the  Poles  the  difficulties  (a) 
strategic,  (&)  economic,  (c)  due  to  mixture  of  population,  that 
may  stand  in  the  way  of  reconstructing  a  nationality  as  an 
independent  state. 

Do  the  Poles  look  upon  Prussia  or  Russia  as  the  deadlier 
enemy? 

What  conditions  or  compensations,  short  of  extinction  as  a 
military  power,  would  suffice  to  persuade  Germany  to  give  up 
the  greater  part  of  the  Duchy  of  Posen  to  create  an  indepen- 
dent state  or  an  autonomous  unit  within  Russia? 

Would  it  be  possible  to  give  an  independent  Poland  access 
to  the  sea  without  violating  the  principle  of  nationality? 

See  Phillips,  Poland  (Holt:  Home  University  Library); 
Gibbons,  The  Reconstruction  of  Poland  and  the  Near  East 
(Century) ;  Lewinski-Corwin,  The  Political  History  of  Poland 
(Polish  Book  Importing  Co.) ;  The  War  and  Democracy  (Mac- 
millan);  Fayle,  The  Great  Settlement  (Duffield);  Toynbee, 
Nationality  and  the  War  (Dutton);  Ehrlich,  Poland,  Prussia 
and  Culture  (Oxford  Pamphlets) ;  Rose,  The  Polish  Problem : 
Past  and  Present',  Contemporary  Review,  December,  1916. 


XIV.  A  general  association  of  nations  must  he  formed  under 
specific  covenants  for  the  purpose  of  affording  mutual  guarantees 
of  political  independence  and  territorial  integrity  to  great  and 
small  states  alike. 

A  very  full  bibliography  on  a  League  of  Nations  will  be 
found  in  Goldsmith,  A  League  to  Enforce  Peace  (Macmillan). 
This  book,  however,  as  has  been  said,  does  not  attempt  to 
apply  the  principles  which  it  easily  establishes  in  theory  to 
the  vexing  problems  of  mid-European  politics.  The  student, 
therefore,  will  find  of  more  service  the  following  books: 
Brailsford,  A  League  of  Nations  (Macmillan);  Woolf,  Inter- 
national Government  (Brentano);  Woolf,  The  Framework  of 
a  Lasting  Peace  (Allen  and  Unwin) ;  Hobson,  Towards  Inter- 
national Government  (Macmillan)  and  Dickinson,  The  Choice 

52 


Before  Us  (Dodd,  Mead).  Many  valuable  articles  have  ap- 
peared in  the  reviews.  Some  of  these  have  been  reprinted  by 
the  World  Peace  Foundation  and  the  League  to  Enforce  Peace. 
Others  that  may  be  mentioned  are  Macdonell,  'Armed  Paci- 
fism', Contemporary  Review,  March,  191 7;  Dickinson,  'A 
League  of  Nations  and  Its  Critics',  Contemporary  Review, 
June,  1917.  More  elaborate  outlines  of  proposed  Leagues 
than  the  programme  of  the  American  organization  are  given 
by  Mr.  Brailsford  and  Mr.  Woolf. 

How  far  is  it  true  that  America  does  not  need  a  League  to 
Enforce  Peace  for  her  own  protection? 

Should  a  League  of  Nations  be  formed  when  the  war  ends 
or  would  it  be  better  to  wait  until  hatred  between  the  belliger- 
ents has  become  less  bitter? 

How  far  do  you  think  the  various  war  aims  outlined  by 
Mr.  Wilson,  Mr.  Lloyd  George,  British  Labor,  Count  Hert- 
ling,  the  Bolsheviki,  etc.,  should  be  modified  (a)  if  in  the 
future  there  are  no  safeguards  against  aggression  other  than 
those  existing  when  the  war  began,  or  (6)  if  there  is  mutual 
protection  by  a  League  of  Nations? 

How  far  should  sea-power  be  an  instrument  of  a  League  of 
Nations?  (See  Norman  Angell's  The  World's  Highway  and 
the  references  given  above  under  freedom  of  the  seas.) 

How  great  is  the  danger  that  nations  will  make  secret,  re- 
insurance agreements  with  each  other?  Is  a  successful  League 
of  Nations  dependent  upon  open  diplomacy? 

To  what  extent  must  a  League  of  Peace  demand  from  its 
members  adherence  at  all  times,  on  pain  of  expulsion,  or  some 
other  penalty,  to  certain  fundamental  principles,  such  as  the 
principle  of  nationality  and  commercial  freedom,  including 
questions  of  tariffs  at  home  and  in  the  colonies,  and  guarantees 
for  fair  opportunities  all  round  over  questions  of  export  of 
capital,  access  to  raw  materials,  etc.?  This  question  may  be 
discussed  in  connection  with  the  more  general  one:  To  what 
extent  should  a  League  of  Peace  aim  simply  at  preventing 
the  outbreak  of  actual  wars,  and  how  far  might  it  venture 
to  embark  upon  an  attempt  to  remove  the  causes  of  mutual 
hostility  among  its  members  eventually  to  an  open  breach 
between  them? 

53 


How  far  should  Parliaments  as  well  as  Foreign  Offices  be 
represented  on  the  International  Bodies  which  are  to  "function 
for  the  League  of  Nations? 

Germany  is  ready  at  all  times  to  join  a  League  of  Nations  and  even 
to  place  herself  at  the  head  of  a  League  which  will  restrain  the  dis- 
turber of  peace.  (Chancellor  von  Bethmann-Hollweg  to  the  Com- 
mittee of  the  Reichstag,  November  9,  1916.) 

What  should  be  the  attitude  of  a  League  of  Nations  towards 
the  Central  Powers? 

The  following  quotations  are  from  Muir,  'The  Difficulties 
of  a  League  of  Peace',  The  New  Europe,  February  i,  191 7: 

L  The  first  and  most  obvious  condition  for  the  successful  organi- 
zation of  a  League  of  Peace  is  that  there  must  he  no  single  power,  or 
group  of  Powers t  dominated  by  a  single  will,  so  strong  as  to  be  able  to  defy 
the  rest  of  the  world,  and,  therefore,  to  be  tempted  by  the  prospect  of  world- 
supremacy. 

Is  this  a  valid  condition? 

Would  the  British  Commonwealth  alone,  or  with  the  United 
States  in  a  union  of  the  English-speaking  peoples,  be  strong 
enough  to  defy  the  rest  of  the  world  ? 

Does  this  condition  mean  that  Germany's  "Mittel-Europa" 
scheme  must  be  completely  destroyed? 

II.  The  second  preliminary  condition  of  the  organization  of  a 
League  of  Peace  is  that  the  political  distribution  of  Europe  and  {as  far 
as  possible)  of  the  whole  world,  must  be  drawn  upon  lines  which  promise 
permanence,  by  being  based,  not  on  the  mere  accidents  of  conquest 
or  dynastic  inheritance,  but  on  clear  and  defensible  principles,  on 
reason,  and  on  justice. 

Is  this  condition  valid? 

Should  a  League  of  Nations  guarantee  the  status  quo  (a) 
except  as  altered  by  peaceful  agreement?  or  (b)  except  as 
altered  by  international  council?  See  the  books  by  Woolf 
cited  above  and  Phillips,  The  Confederation  of  Europe  (Long- 
mans) which  discusses  the  Holy  Alliance  and  is  not  hopeful 
of  the  success  of  a  League  of  Nations. 

III.  Suppose  these  preliminary  conditions  to  be  satisfactorily  met, 
we  are  faced  at  the  outset  by  a  difficulty  which  affects  the  membership 
of  the  League.    If  the  nations  are  to  have  confidence  in  it  as  a  means 

54 


of  preserving  peace,  it  must  include  no  States  which  cannot  he  trusted  to 
fulfill  the  responsibilities  of  membership.  Every  State  must  have  reason- 
able ground  for  certainty  that,  if  it  is  attacked  or  if  any  of  the  principles 
of  international  law  are  infringed,  all  the  other  members  of  the  league 
will  take  such  active  steps  as  may  be  required  by  the  league's  consti- 
tution. 

Is  this  condition  valid?  (See  the  suggestions  and  questions 
above  under  B.  and  D.  and  Norman  Angell's  War  Aims:  The 
Need  for  a  Parliament  of  the  Allies  [Headley].) 

Would  it  be  safe  to  include  in  the  League  a  government 
like  the  United  States  where  the  treaty-making  authority 
cannot  commit  the  country  to  war  as  a  means  of  coercing  a 
recalcitrant  state? 

Would  the  danger  be  greater  than  in  England  where  the 
Parliament,  although  having  no  formal  control  over  foreign 
policy,  holds  the  purse  strings? 

IV.  Assuming  that  some  sort  of  League  of  Peace  is  to  be  established, 
we  are  next  brought  up  against  the  difficulty  of  devising  for  it  a  system 
of  direction.  Not  long  since  I  listened  to  a  lecture  by  an  eminent 
lawyer,^  in  which  he  commended  the  idea  of  the  league  as  a  sure  safe- 
guard against  war,  and  proved,  to  his  own  satisfaction,  that,  if  such  a 
league  had  existed  in  19 14,  the  present  war  would  not  have  broken 
out;  and,  indeed,  we  may  very  readily  agree  that  if  the  conditions 
which  would  make  a  League  of  Peace  a  practical  proposal  had  existed 
in  1914  there  would  have  been  no  war.  Having  said  so  much,  the 
lecturer  went  on  to  observe :  "Of  course,  the  league  must  have  a  com- 
mon executive  and  a  general  staff;"  and,  saying  that,  he  passed  on  to 
other  topics,  as  if  the  establishment  of  a  common  executive  and  a 
general  staff  presented  no  difficulties  at  all.  Now  it  is  plain  that  the 
constitution  of  the  league  must  depend  upon  the  character  of  its 
component  members.  If  they  trust  and  understand  one  another,  its 
system  may  be  simple  and  unelaborate.  But  if,  as  seems  to  be  assumed 
by  many  of  its  advocates,  it  is  to  include  all  the  civilized  States  of  the 
world,  it  will  require  a  very  carefully-worked-out  system  of  adminis- 
tration: a  sort  of  federal  council  of  civilization. 

Is  this  difficulty  insurmountable? 

How  is  it  worked  out  in  the  schemes  suggested  by  Mr. 
Woolf  and  Mr.  Brailsford? 

1  Sir  Frederick  Pollock,  whose  lecture  was  partly  published  in  the  Fortnightly  Review, 
December,  19 16. 


With  what  chances  of  success? 

V.  If  or  when  the  war  ends  with  victory  of  the  AUied  Powers,  the 
conditions  essential  for  the  existence  of  a  League  of  Peace,  as  we  have 
aheady  defined  them,  will  have  been  largely  secured.  But  not  only 
that;  there  will  exist,  in  fact,  a  great  League  of  Peace  consisting  of 
ten  States,  which  will  have  held  together  as  no  alliance  has  ever  held 
together  before  in  history,  which  will  have  learnt  to  trust  and  under- 
stand one  another,  and  which  will  be  united  in  the  resolve  to  prevent 
the  recurrence  of  such  a  catastrophe.  If  they  win  their  victory,  they 
will  be  strong  enough  to  secure  peace  for  the  future.  They  will  include 
five  of  the  seven  great  States  of  the  world — the  British  Empire,  France, 
Italy,  Russia,  and  Japan — and  five  of  the  lesser  States  of  Europe,  some 
of  which — notably  Rumania  and  Serbia — will  be  much  more  powerful 
than  they  have  ever  been  before.  This  group  of  States  will  be  pro- 
foundly distrustful  of  their  defeated  foes,  whose  treacheries  have 
caused  them  so  much  agony;  and  in  order  to  guard  against  any  future 
recrudescence  of  the  danger,  they  will  be  anxious  to  maintain  their 
well-tried  and  friendly  cooperation,  and  to  devise  means  for  preventing 
any  cleavage  among  them,  such  as  might  encourage  their  defeated 
enemy  to  raise  his  head  again  and  revive  his  malign  ambitions. 


What  forms  will  this  cooperation  take? 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Angell,  The  World's  Highway  (Doran). 

Angell,  War  Aims:  The  Need  for  a  Parliament  of  the  Allies  (Headley). 

Brailsford,  a  League  of  Nations  (Macmillan). 

Dickinson,  The  Choice  Before  Us  (Dodd,  Mead). 

Goldsmith,  A  League  to  Enforce  Peace  (Macmillan). 

HoBSON,  Towards  International  Government  (Macmillan). 

Phillips,  The  Confederation  of  Europe  (Longmans). 

WooLF,  International  Government  (Brentano). 

WOOLF,  The  Framework  of  a  Lasting  Peace  (Allen  and  Unwin). 

Contemporary  Review. 
The  New  Europe, 
The  New  Republic. 
The  Nation  (London), 


56 


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